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OBSOLESCENCE AND IMMANENCE IN
PENAL THEORY AND POLICY
Michael Tonry*
To be useful, theories of punishment must speak to the issues of their
times. Predominantmodern theories centering on desert and proportionality
took shape in the 1970s when they spoke to concerns about racialdisparities,
proceduralunfairness, and beliefs in the ineffectiveness and injustice of rehabilitative programs. None of those concerns continues to galvanize policymakers, practitioners,or the general public. Punishment theories are stuck
in the 1970s, speaking still to 1970s issues and unable satisfactorily to address contemporary developments such as burgeoning interest in restorative
and community justice, renewed faith in the effectiveness and appropriateness of rehabilitation, and proliferation of drug and other courts aimed at
changing offenders. Punishment theories sometimes influence policymakers,
and often they clarify understandingof the implications of policy choices.
Consequently, there is a need for the development of new theoretical
frameworks that can speak to the issues and temper of these times.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................
I. THINKING ABOUT PUNISHMENT ............................

A. Punishm ent Theory ..................................
B. Punishment Practices and Policies ....................
II.
III.

THE DEMISE OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING ...............
HOW THE (RELEVANT BITS OF) THE WORLD CHANGED FROM
1975 TO 2005 ............................................

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
IV.

V.

Crim e Rates .........................................
Rehabilitation ........................................
Racial Disparities .....................................
Sentencing Disparities ................................
Fairness ..............................................

1233
1239
1241
1243
1245
1249
1249
1252
1254
1257
1259

NORMATIVE CONSEQUENCES ................................

1260

A. Ideas for the 1970s ...................................
B. Ideas for the Twenty-First Century ....................
1. Refinement of Limiting Retributivism ............
2. Emerging Conceptions of Justice .................

1261
1267
1267
1268
1270

POLICY IMPLICATIONS ......................................

INTRODUCTION

Writings on penal theory and punishment philosophy may be independent or dependent variables: They may cause changes in the world or
result from them. It is unclear to me which of these is true. Do the ideas
come first and in their application change the ways we think and the
* Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota, and Senior
Fellow, Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, Leiden.
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things we do, or does the world change and provide differently enriched
soil in which ideas are born or revivified? Did the emergence of writing
in the 1950s and 1960s that challenged then-prevalent utilitarian ideas
about punishment' lead to their rejection by most theorists, practitioners,
and policymakers in the 1970s and 1980s? Did the espousal of retributivist, just deserts, and proportionality ideas by writers in the 1970s 2 lead
in the 1980s and the 1990s to widespread adoption of penal policies
aimed at providing offenders the punishments they deserved?
The answer, I believe, is that the seeds of normative ideas are always
with us, but whether they hibernate or blossom depends on changing
sensibilities and material conditions. This Essay shows how understanding of the origins of ideas, policies, and practices concerning punishment
can be enhanced if we can become more self-aware about why and when
particular ideas and normative beliefs come into fashion.
The 1970s were a time of transition in punishment practices and policies. In 1970, the highly discretionary and individualized punishment
systems encapsulated in the phrase "indeterminate sentencing" were
ubiquitous in the United States. In every state and the federal system
(and in the Model Penal Code's prescriptions), statutes seldom did more
than define crimes and set maximum penalties. Mandatory penalties
were few in number and modest in scope, prosecutors had unaccountable power over charging and plea bargaining, judges' sentencing discretion was constrained only by statutory sentencing maximums, and parole
boards had broad or plenary authority to release prisoners subject, usu3
ally, only to the maximum prison term set by the judge or the legislature.
Chicago law professor Albert Alschuler, commenting on unquestioning
1. See, e.g., Edmund L. Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment 2 (1966)
[hereinafter Pincoffs, Legal Punishment] (arguing that neither utilitarian nor retributive
theories provide an adequate justification for punishment); Francis A. Allen, Legal Values
and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in The Borderland of Criminal Justice 25, 25-28 (1964)
[hereinafter Allen, Legal Values] (explaining rise of rehabilitative ideal and resulting
controversies); H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
Punishment and Responsibility 1, 8 (1968) (claiming that main justification for
punishment "lies in the fact that when breach of the law involves moral guilt the
application to the offender of the pain of punishment is itself a thing of value"); John
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 3-5 (1955) (proposing that utilitarian
justifications for punishment are appropriate for justifying practices, while retributive
justifications should be applied to specific cases).
2. See, e.g., John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert 65-72 (1973) (rationalizing
punishment on theory of just deserts); Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 58
(1974) [hereinafter Morris, Future] ("In my view, penal purposes are properly retributive
and deterrent."); Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 69
(1976) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Justice] (arguing that principle of proportionality or just
deserts "is a requirement ofjustice"); Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in Doing
and Deserving 55 (1970) (analyzing concept of "just desert").
3. Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice 126-41, 188-91 (1969). Sometimes
judges could set minimum sentences up to one-third of the maximum, though this was a
minority practice, and the minimum sentence itself was reduced through the operation of
time off for good behavior. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 305.1 (Proposed Official Draft
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acceptance in the 1960s of the ideas underlying indeterminate sentencing, observed in 1978: "That I and many other academics adhered in
large part to this reformative viewpoint only a decade or so ago seems
'4
almost incredible to most of us today."
By 1980, the empirical and conceptual foundations of indeterminate
sentencing had been washed away. Many state and federal policymakers
contemplated radical overhauls of their sentencing systems, and the beginnings of fragmented modern systems that promiscuously combined retributive, consequentialist, and expressive elements, had become apparent.5 Some states developed parole guidelines, some developed
sentencing guidelines, some developed both; some prosecutors created
charging and bargaining guidelines and some "abolished" plea-bargaining; some states eliminated discretionary parole release. 6 Mandatory
minimum sentences, out of vogue in the 1960s and comprehensively re7
pealed in the federal system in 1970, proliferated.
So what happened in the 197 0s to effect wholesale rejection of the
indeterminate sentencing system, which had survived nearly unchanged
and unchallenged in most states for three-quarters of a century, and
which in a richer, fuller form had in 1962 been enthusiastically endorsed
by the American Law Institute?8
Answers can be offered at various levels. The simplest answers would
identify policy entrepreneurs, such as federal district court judge Marvin
Frankel, and trace out the influence of their proposals.9
Slightly more complicated answers look at the influence of prevailing
policy critiques of the legal system: concerns about arbitrariness in criminal justice decisionmaking1 ° motivated in general by unwarranted sen1962) (stating that reduction in prison sentence awarded for good behavior shall be
deducted "from [the prisoner's] minimum term of imprisonment").
4. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 550, 552
(1978).
5. See Michael Tonry, The Fragmentation of Sentencing and Corrections in America,
in U.S. Nat'l Inst. ofJustice, No. 1, Sentencing and Corrections: Issues for the 21st Century
1 (1999) [hereinafter Tonry, Fragmentation] (summarizing the collapse of indeterminate
sentencing system).
6. See 1 Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform 130-40 (Alfred Blumstein
et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Research on Sentencing] (describing these trends).
7. Id. at 132-33 (noting that "between 1977 and 1980, mandatory minimum
sentencing laws were adopted by 27 states and were under consideration in at least 14
others").
8. See David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience 3-4 (1980) (describing the
"vigorous debate" challenging established programs and institutions within the criminal
justice system during late 1970s and early 1980s); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. See Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law without Order passim (1972)
(decrying sentencing disparities and espousing creation of sentencing commissions
charged with developing guidelines).
10. See Davis, supra note 3, at 29-30 (equating discretionary power with arbitrary
power, and arguing that such power should be "eliminated to whatever extent it can be
eliminated without undue sacrifice of other values that may be deemed more important").
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tencing disparities" and in particular by disparities attributed to racial
discrimination; 12 the maturation of the due process revolution of the
1960s heralded by Goldberg v. Kelly' 3 and the Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence; 14 and loss of confidence in correctional rehabilitative programs on ethical' 5 and empirical 16 grounds.
The most complicated answers attempt to understand why particular
ideas and policies about crime and punishment take hold at some places
and times and not at others. They find explanations over time in changing social-structural and economic conditions' 7 and across space in distinctive penal traditions, variant constitutional arrangements, and diverse
political cultures.' 8
These works offer theories and hypotheses to explain postindeterminate sentencing penal policy changes in the United States between 1975 and 2005. They attempt to explain why particular new punishment edifices and ideologies have been built upon the ruins of
indeterminate sentencing. To my knowledge, however, no similar literature exists to explain the equally dramatic penal policy changes embod11. See Frankel, supra note 9, at 5 ("[T]he almost wholly unchecked and sweeping
powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a
society that professes devotion to the rule of law.").
12. See Am. Friends Serv. Comm., Struggle for Justice: A Report on Crime and
Punishment in America 130 (1971) (arguing that discretion within criminal justice system
enables politically and economically dominant class to control minorities and other groups
seen as threats to social order).
13. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
14. See Francis A. Allen, The Habits of Legality: CriminalJustice and the Rule of Law
65-66 (1996) [hereinafter Allen, Habits] (describing how during the Warren Court in
particular, but also "before and after, a formidable and highly volatile body of
constitutional doctrine pertaining to the rights of suspected persons ... emerged").
15. See Allen, Legal Values, supra note 1, at 33 (arguing that "the rehabilitative ideal
has been debased in practice and that the consequences resulting from this debasement
are serious and, at times, dangerous").
16. See Robert Martinson, What Works: Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, Pub. Int., Spring 1974, at 22, 22-23, 49 (surveying two hundred controlled studies
of treatments designed to rehabilitate offenders, and concluding that there is "very little
reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of reducing recidivism through
rehabilitation").
17. See generally David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in
Contemporary Society viii (2001) (identifying "broad organizing principles that structure
our contemporary ways of thinking and acting in crime control and criminal justice");
Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population
Trends, 26 Crime & Just. 63, 65 (1999) (characterizing "contemporary imprisonment
policies as efforts to answer a classic sociological question, that is, What drives trends in
punishment?").
18. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Thinking About Crime: Sense and Sensibility in
American Penal Culture 9-10 (2004) [hereinafter Tonry, Thinking] (arguing that U.S.
sentencing policies are harsher than those of other countries because "[t] he organization
of American government makes it especially vulnerable to emotional overreaction");James
Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between Europe
and America passim (2003) (examining why America's criminal justice system metes out
harsher punishments than those of other Western societies).
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ied in the implosion of indeterminate sentencing that, with the benefit of
hindsight, we now know began in the 1950s, although few noticed it at
20
the time. 19 This Essay does not attempt to explain these changes.
Rather, it looks back to the midlevel policy concerns (rising crime rates,
arbitrariness, disparities, racial discrimination, and ineffectiveness) that
at least coincided with the collapse of indeterminate sentencing and the
development of successor institutions and practices. It considers how effectively those concerns have been addressed over time, and attempts to
demonstrate to what extent they remain topical today.
The galvanizing policy problems of the 1970s are no longer policy
preoccupations in the twenty-first century. Racial disparities in punishment and risks of procedural unfairness to offenders are greater in 2005
than they were in the mid-1970s, as are sentencing disparities generally.
Both the ethical and effectiveness critiques of rehabilitative programs
have largely disappeared. Racial disparities in imprisonment are substantially higher in 2005 than they were in 1975, and patterns of drug law
enforcement and sentencing have made them worse. Widespread adoption of mandatory sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum sentence
laws, and "three strikes" laws-and the adaptive responses they have provoked among practitioners-have produced sentencing disparities at
least as great in 2005 as existed in 1975.21 There is widespread support
for the view that "treatment works" amidst few ethical compunctions
against attempts to change people through coercion. As a result, policymakers in the United States and England are happily increasing public
19. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 50 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 226, 229-30 (1959) [hereinafter Allen,
Criminal Justice] (arguing that rise of rehabilitative ideal was accompanied by measures
that conflict with individual liberty and can therefore be justified by "only the most clear
and compelling reasons"); C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 Res
Judicatae 224, 224 (1953) (arguing that return to retributive theory of punishment would
benefit defendants' interests more than "humanitarian" theory); Norval Morris,
Sentencing Convicted Criminals, 27 Austl. L.J. 186, 186 (1953) [hereinafter Morris,
Sentencing] (criticizing judiciary for "fail[ing] to develop any agreed principles or
practices" to achieve "uniformity and equality" in criminal sentencing).
20. On the converse question, why did indeterminate sentencing survive, little
questioned, for so long? In its title, David Rothman's Conscience and Convenience gives a
standard answer: The ostensible dedication of indeterminate sentencing to reformation
and rehabilitation of offenders rested comfortably with the welfare aspirations of the time
(hence conscience), and the vast discretions it accorded officials acknowledged and
reinforced their self-esteem (and power) and made management comparatively
unchallenging, since no one looked over the managers' shoulders (hence convenience).
See Rothman, supra note 8.
21. See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a
Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1043, 1049 (1983)
(explaining that decline in average drug sentences is due in part to "a widespread
perception among the foot soldiers of the criminal justice system-the prosecutors,
defense attorneys, probation officers, and district judges-that drug sentences are often
too high").
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investments in criminal justice treatment programs and just as happily
coercing people to participate in them.
Modem penal theories and sentencing policies, however, have not
yet substantially taken account of this changed context, and may correspond to theories and policies in the 1960s, when underlying norms and
beliefs were changing rapidly but only barely discernibly. Desert theories
have probably run their course. They will likely modulate into discussions of punishment's justifying aims and "negative" desert arguments asserting that desert considerations can tell us only how severely offenders
may be punished, and not how severely they ought to be punished. 22 Punishment theorists will have to begin developing normative frameworks for
greater individualization of punishment and for principled use of compelled treatment in just punishment systems. They will also have to take
on an entirely new but related job: development of normative
frameworks for the principled application of emerging institutions of restorative and community justice. These things are doable, but until now,
the times have not required that they be done.
This Essay consists of five Parts. The first introduces an analytical
framework for thinking about changes in punishment norms and policies. What we think we see, believe, and know largely depends on where
we are and when. Ideas come in and out of vogue depending on prevailing sensibilities-the ethoi of diverse times. Changing sensibilities shape
the ways we understand the world, the problems we consider important,
and the solutions we think viable. Much of the theorizing about crime
and punishment in the past century, and much of the accompanying
evolution in criminal justice policies, can best be understood as the byproduct of prevailing sensibilities. Secular developments necessarily lag
behind changing sensibilities. Much writing about punishment has
lagged in this way, like a fly caught in amber, and therefore, predictably,
often risks irrelevance. If we can become more aware of changing sensibilities, we can adapt analyses and policies to them in ways that honor
important values.
Part II offers a brief recitative of the flowering of the sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s. The key points are that indeterminate sentencing was monolithic in 1970 and existed in mildly variant
forms in every American jurisdiction, but went into rapid decline after
1975 to be replaced by a crazy quilt of diverse systems.
Part III presents "then and now" comparisons of the states of play in
1975 and 2005 concerning five key backdrops to the sentencing reform
movement: crime trends, rehabilitation, racial bias and disparities, sentencing disparities generally, and fairness to offenders. These changes
have important implications for normative analyses of punishment and
22. Positive retributivism, or desert, specifies what punishments must be imposed in a
just punishment system; negative retributivism specifies what punishments may, but need
not, be imposed. See R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community 12 (2001)
(discussing limits of positive and negative retributivist rationales).
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form the bounds of political permission within which policymakers must
operate.
Part IV looks at the prevailing contemporary punishment jurisprudence, most notably desert theories, but also, briefly, communicative and
limiting retributivist theories. It considers how well these theories take
account of the policy concerns and climate of 2005 and of new attitudes
and research findings concerning rehabilitation. The not very controversial main conclusion is that limiting retributivist theories can accommodate the new context and evidence; the more controversial conclusion is
that desert theories cannot and to some extent stand exposed as cultural
byproducts of a decade, the 1970s, the penal sensibilities of which have
passed.
Part V shifts attention to penal policy and identifies a number of
developments that retributive theories cannot accommodate: proliferation of restorative and community justice initiatives, increased investment
in rehabilitative programs and sanctions, and institutionalization of drug
courts and other special purpose courts patterned on them. New or significantly refined penal theories and philosophies are immanent in the
changing sensibilities that underlie new policies and practices. They
need to be drawn out and developed, or penal theory and punishment
philosophy will become irrelevant. Though the world of affairs can get
along just fine without paying much attention to theory, that would be a
pity. Normative theories can help expose contradictions and anomalies
and provide calipers by which the justness of policies, practices, and punishments can be measured.
I.

THINKING ABOUT PUNISHMENT

Efforts to understand legal system changes are aided by distinguishing among sensibilities, theories, and policies. "Sensibility" is a termpopularized by German sociologist Norbert Elias 23 and revived by Scottish sociologist David Garland 24-that describes the prevailing ethos, the
zeitgeist, of a time. Sensibilities are shared assumptions and understandings, difficult to see in one's own time and easier to see in others', that
shape perceptions of the world. Penal sensibilities in the 1930s, for example, included assumptions about the environmental and psychological
causes of criminal behavior, the malleability of human beings, the ethical
desirability of rehabilitating offenders, and the capacity of correctional

23. Norbert Elias, The History of Manners 110 (Edmund Jephcott trans., Pantheon
Books 1978) (1939) (referring to ways in which bourgeois language was "adapted to the
standard of sensibility of the court circles" in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France).
24. Garland, supra note 17, at 6 (suggesting that changing institutional responses to
crime are reflective of "a new pattern of mentalities, interests, and sensibilities that has

altered how we think and feel about the underlying problem").
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and other programs to do so. 25 This set of largely unquestioned assumptions made it easy for practitioners, policymakers, and professors to accept utilitarian theories and ideas about punishment, and made it difficult for them to accept retributive ideas.
Punishment theories are efforts to make comprehensive normative
statements about the justness both of broad punishment policies and
practices and of punishments in individual cases. 2 6 The simplest partitioning is between deontological theories concerned with achievement of
just outcomes in individual cases as ends in themselves and teleological
theories concerned with achievement ofjust outcomes as means to ends.
Conventionally, deontological theories of punishment, most famously associated with Kant and Hegel, are called retributive theories and are centrally concerned with the moral appropriateness of individual punishments in relation to offenders' culpability. 27 Teleological theories of
punishment, in recent decades called consequentialist theories, are centrally concerned with maximization of some measure of aggregate social
benefit, usually called general prevention. 28 Thus, for retributivists, ajust
punishment is one that is morally appropriate, or proportionate, for this
offender for that offense. For consequentialists, ajust punishment is one
that minimizes the costs of crime and related institutions and practices.
A punishment is unjust if it does not serve that end or is unnecessary to its
achievement.

29

25. See Rothman, supra note 8, at 50-61 (describing environmental, psychological,
and genetic assumptions underlying three different progressive-era approaches to
deviancy).
26. When I use the word "theory," I refer to both the "philosophy of punishment" and
"penal theory." A distinction is sometimes made between them. See, e.g., R.A. Duff & D.
Garland, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in A Reader on Punishment 1, 1
(R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (attempting to "establish[] a dialogue between
[the] closely related endeavors of' the philosophy of punishment and penal theory). The
distinction may be disciplinary, distinguishing writings by philosophers from those by
lawyers and social scientists, or the distinction may be between theoretical writing at a fairly
high level of abstraction and theoretical writing that addresses concrete policy choices, in
effect a contrast between philosophy and applied philosophy.
27. See generally Georg W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right 69-70 (T.M. Knox
trans. 1967) (1821) (stating that important considerations for punishment are "first, that
crime is to be annulled, not because it is the producing of an evil, but because it is an
infringement of the right as right, and secondly, the question of what that positive
existence is which crime possesses and which must be annulled"); Immanuel Kant, The
Metaphysical Elements of Justice, in Foundations of Criminal Law 75 (Leo Katz et al. eds.,
1999) ("Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other
good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed
on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime.").
28. See generally Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment 20 (1830)
[hereinafter Bentham, Rationale] ("General prevention ought to be the chief end of
punishment, as it is its real justification.").
29. That is the origin of the utilitarian parsimony principle: Any punishment greater
than is required to achieve its end is unjust.
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"Policies" are public choices about institutions (e.g., parole boards,
sentencing commissions, guidelines, mandatory minimums) and practices (e.g., plea bargaining, parole release, risk prediction, electronic
monitoring, drug treatment). Policies are more or less consistent with
theories and sensibilities, and can be characterized and criticized relative
to both. Policies are likelier to coexist with inconsistent theories (as, for
example, three strikes laws have coexisted with retributive theories) than
with inconsistent sensibilities. Once the penal sensibilities associated with
indeterminate sentencing passed away, for example, release decisions by
30
parole boards became hard to explain and quickly lost legitimacy.
This is not the place to write at length about interactions among
sensibilities, theories, and policies. Much of the body of this Essay does
that. Instead I offer two kinds of illustrations of the power of changing
sensibilities.
A. Punishment Theory
During the peak periods of indeterminate (1935-1960) and determinate (1975-2000) sentencing, particular powerful ideas were conspicuously absent. The key ideas underlying indeterminate sentencing-environmental determinism, human malleability, the power of a benevolent
state-left little room for retributive ideas. Likewise, the key ideas underlying determinate sentencing-equality, consistency, evenhandedness,
procedural fairness, moral autonomy-left little room for consequentialist ideas.
Herbert Wechsler, Paul Tappan, and Louis Schwartz, the towering
intellectuals who developed the Model Penal Code, knew about and no
doubt had read Kant and Hegel. They knew and understood the Kantian
argument that respect for offenders' moral autonomy requires that they
be punished in proportion to the seriousness of their crimes. 3 ' Search,
however, through the twelve years of American Law Institute proceedings
on the Code's punishment and sentencing provisions, and you will find
not one person arguing that the imposition of morally deserved or proportionate punishments should be a major objective; words like retribu32
tion and just deserts are entirely absent from the discussion.
There is a reason for this: Retributive ideas were seen as atavistic and
vengeful. Edmund Pincoffs summarized the conventional utilitarian critique as follows:
30. See, e.g., Morris, Future, supra note 2, at 31-49 (describing attacks since 1975 on
"arbitrariness" of parole); Andrew von Hirsch, The Question of Parole 4 (1979) (same).
31. See Kant, supra note 27, at 76 ("Only the Law of retribution . .. can determine
exactly the kind and degree of punishment.").
32. See Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at 176-79 (stating that "the Model Penal
Code . . . rarely mentions desert, retribution, or proportionality in its text or original
commentary, and echoes of such ideas only occasionally appear in the transcripts of the
American Law Institute ('ALl') meetings at which successive drafts were discussed").
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[I]f only desert is relevant, what, as retributivists, can we say in
justifying a particular sentence? Are we not confined to talking
about the heinousness of the criminal's deed? ... [A]re we not
then using the language of revenge? ... Is the language of retribution not just a smooth and sophisticated cover for a morally
questionable motive, the motive to take vengeance ... ?33
Conversely, in the 1970s and 1980s, philosophers Andrew von
Hirsch, Antony Duff, and Jeffrey Murphy knew and understood Bentham's view that the ethical measure of a government practice is whether
in the aggregate it maximizes human happiness or satisfaction. Search in
their writings, however, for arguments about how criminal law and punishment can be used to maximize offenders' or aggregate social well-being, and you will search nearly in vain. In Herbert Morris, Murphy, and
Duff, you will find communicative ideas about using punishment as a
mechanism for moral education, for facilitating offenders' understanding
of the moral character of their wrongdoing. 34 In Murphy, von Hirsch,
and Duff, you will find discussion of the problem of 'Just deserts in an
unjust world"-recognition that unequal distribution of life chances
makes it far easier for some to be law-abiding than for others-but you
will find no proposals for how punishment can be used to enhance life
35
chances or to compensate for disadvantages.

33. Edmund L. Pincoffs, Philosophy of Law: A Brief Introduction 22 (1991). Similar
characterizations of consequentialists' views of retributive arguments are offered in the first
major modern American and English books on punishment theories. See, e.g., H.L.A.
Hart, Postscript: Responsibility and Retribution, in Punishment and Responsibility, supra
note 1, at 210, 231 (describing an extreme version of retributive theory, in which
punishment is justified because "the return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done, is
itself just or morally good"); Pincoffs, Legal Punishment, supra note 1, at 43
("Retributivists are often, and in a variety of ways, accused of wishing to have revenge upon
the criminal, and deceiving themselves and others by disguising this wish as a demand of
justice.").
34. See generally R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 8 (1986) [hereinafter Duff,
Trials] (articulating desire that criminal justice system will become "one to which the
defendant is meant to respond, and in which she is called to participate, as a rational moral
agent"); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 Am. Phil. Q. 263 (1981)
(advocating that punishment carry a communicative component which "convey[s] to the
wrongdoer . . . that the deprivation is imposed because of wrongdoing"); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education and the Liberal State, 4 Crim. Just. Ethics 3, 7-9
(1985) (acknowledging power and importance of moral education theory of punishment,
but questioning how moral theories can fit within ideology of liberalism).
35. See generally Duff, Trials, supra note 34, at 294 (stating that if "deep and farreaching social, political, legal and moral changes" occur in society, "we may find.., that
there will be no need for punishment"); von Hirsch, Justice, supra note 2, at 143-49
(discussing problem of "Just Deserts in an Unjust Society," and concluding that, "[a]s long
as a substantial segment of the population is denied adequate opportunities for a
livelihood, any scheme for punishing must be morally flawed"); Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism
and Retribution, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 217 (1973) [hereinafter Murphy, Marxism] (arguing
that "retributivism, despite the bad press that it has received, is a morally credible theory of
punishment").
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B. Punishment Practices and Policies
Prevailing sensibilities also predispose us to believe things about the
world that we would not believe in other times. Emblematic crime con36
trol policies of the 1990s-"zero tolerance" policing in New York City
and three strikes sentencing laws in California (Three Strikes) 37-offer
examples. Though both policies may, at the margins, have influenced
crime rates and patterns, there is no credible evidence that they affected
levels or rates of crime generally.3 8 Yet major politicians in both places,
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Governor Pete Wilson, claimed that the new
and policymakers
initiatives produced subsequent declines in crime rates,
39
in many other places appear to have believed them.
All the evidence, however, suggests otherwise. 40 Violent crime rates
in both places had begun to decline in 1990 and 1991, a few years before
the initiatives were adopted in 1993 and 1994, and continued to decline.
The declines are thus best characterized as the continuations of preexisting trends and not as the results of policy changes.
This is confirmed when crime rate patterns in the 1990s (invariably
declines) are compared across state lines. All American cities experienced declines in violent crime rates generally and homicide rates particularly. 41 New York's declines were among the greatest, but that position
was shared with San Diego and Houston, neither of which adopted zero
tolerance policing. 42 Violent crime rates in California declined after enactment of Three Strikes in 1994, but when California's crime rates in the
1990s are compared with those of the other four most populous states, it
can be seen that there is nothing special about California's declines,
which are well within the standard pattern. 43 The weakness of claims that
Three Strikes was a principal cause of California's decline in crime rates

36. See National Problems, Local Solutions: Federalism at Work, Part I: Fighting
Crime in the Trenches: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong.
21-22 (1999) [hereinafter Fighting Crime in the Trenches] (statement of Rudolph W.
Giuliani, Mayor, New York City) (describing crime fighting tactics in New York undertaken
under Giuliani Administration, premised on "broken windows" philosophy that small
things matter).
37. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12 (West 2004).
38. See infra note 40.
39. See Fighting Crime in the Trenches, supra note 36, at 22 (claiming credit for
declines in crime rates); Fox Butterfield, 'Three Strikes' Rarely Invoked in Courtrooms,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1996, at Al (quoting spokesperson for Governor Pete Wilson as
stating that Three Strikes has "lowered our crime rate precipitously").
40. This paragraph and those immediately following it summarize a substantial
amount of data and a sizeable literature. Details and references can be found in Tonry,
Thinking, supra note 18, at 97-139.
41. Id. at 119, 122.
42. Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 124.
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is further demonstrated when crime rate trends are compared in counties
44
that applied the law extensively with those that did not.
There are two principal reasons why so many people mistakenly characterized events. The first is self-interest. We are all psychologically
predisposed to want to believe things that are in our interest. Toughness
on crime was a prominent feature of the political platforms and identities
of Mayor Giuliani and Governor Wilson, and it must have been comfort45
ing when initiatives they promoted appeared to have worked.
Probably more importantly, however, the historical work of David
Musto shows that during periods of declining drug use (and by analogy
declining crime rates) and greater intolerance towards deviance, both
46
practitioners and policymakers become harsher and more punitive.
The twin logics that deviant behaviors warrant more severe responses and
that the declining incidence of those behaviors is the consequence of the
more severe responses fit together nicely. That both the harsher policy
responses and the subsequent declines in deviant behavior could be the
products of a preexisting trend is easy to overlook.
Prevailing sensibilities-the temper of the times-thus affect both
the choice of ideas to honor and how we understand and explain the
world. This is as true of punishment theory and policy as of anything
else, as the development of sentencing policy over the past thirty years
demonstrates.
44. See Franklin E. Zimring et al., Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and
You're Out in California 103 (2001) (suggesting based on study that "no increment of
general or special deterrence gives an advantage[] to counties with higher than average
levels of Three Strikes enforcement").
45. See Joyce Purnick, Busy Being an Icon, Giuliani Keeps Political Future Alive, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 5, 2002, at Al ("[Giuliani] was the tough, I'll-do-it-my-way mayor, credited by
fans with taming New York by cutting crime and the welfare rolls."); Daniel M. Weintraub,
No More Mr. Moderate, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1994, Magazine at 12 (describing Wilson's
repositioning for second term as a "tough talking... ex-marine" with an "immense story of
credibility on the crime issue").
46. See David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control 296 (3d
ed. 1999) (arguing that peaks of overestimation of number of drug users, and
overestimation of percentage of crimes due to narcotic use or sales, have tended to come
before or at the time of most repressive measures against narcotic use); see also Michael
Tonry, Malign Neglect-Race, Crime, and Punishment in America 93 (1995) [hereinafter
Tonry, Malign Neglect] (drawing on Musto's work in claiming that "t]he most intrusive
laws and the cruelest penalties tend to be enacted after intolerance has reached its peak
and when drug use is already falling"). David Kagan summarized Musto's argument thusly:
After drug use peaks and begins to decline,
[1] Public opinion turns against drugs and their acceptability begins to evaporate.
[2] Gradually, drug use becomes associated, truthfully or not, with the lower
ranks of society, and often with racial and ethnic groups that are feared or
despised by the middle class. [3] Drugs become seen as deviant and dangerous
and become a potent symbol of evil. [4] Trailing behind this decline come largescale legislative and law enforcement efforts... aimed at curtailing drug sales and
use through energetic prohibition and enforcement and ever-harsher
punishments against sellers and users.
Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at 130-31.
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THE DEMISE OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING

Desert theories and determinate sentencing were responses to what
widely were considered in the mid-1970s to be pressing problems. At the
time, the shift from ubiquitous indeterminate sentencing systems to a
crazy quilt of new approaches looked sudden and radical. In retrospect,
this was a predictable manifestation of basic changes in sensibilities that
had long been underway. Since the 1970s, however, sensibilities about
crime and punishment have shifted again and in the first decade of the
twenty-first century bear little resemblance to those of thirty years earlier.
Theory and policy analysis need to catch up if they are to be of much use
outside the classroom.
Indeterminate sentencing practices and institutions characterized
every American system of criminal justice on New Year's Day 1975, as they
had from 1930 onward.4 7 Beginning in 1975, every state changed its sentencing system in material ways. 48 Maine was first, shifting from indeterminate to determinate sentencing by simply abolishing parole release
and leaving the rest of the existing system in place. 49 California was next,
enacting the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law of 1976.50 It ended
the practice of parole release, but also prescribed how many years of imprisonment should be ordered for offenders committing standard, aggra51
vated, and mitigated forms of particular offenses.
Within a few years, every state jettisoned major features of indeterminate sentencing. By 1983, every state but Wisconsin had enacted
mandatory minimum sentence laws for offenses other than murder and
drunk driving.5 2 By 1982, Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, Illinois, Maine,
Minnesota, New Mexico, and North Carolina had followed California's
lead and specified sentence lengths in their criminal codes; at least ten
states had eliminated parole release; and at least nine had promulgated
parole guidelines. 53 In addition, at least six states had statewide sentencing guidelines either in effect or under development, and more than fifty
54
jurisdictions had developed local sentencing guidelines.
47. Research on Sentencing, supra note 6, at 39. See generally Rothman, supra note
8, at 43-81 (analyzing and explaining rapidly expanding implementation of individualized
sentencing regimes during progressive era).
48. See generally Sandra Shane-DuBow et al., Sentencing Reform in the United
States: History, Content, and Effect (1985) (reviewing changes to and status of each state
system); Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Assessment of Structured Sentencing 5-18
(1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/strsent.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing historical trends in structured sentencing at state level).
49. Franklin E. Zimring, Sentencing Reform in the States: Lessons from the 1970s, in
Reform and Punishment 101, 101 (Michael Tonry & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 1983).
50. Id. at 116.
51. Research on Sentencing, supra note 6, at 189-91.
52. Shane-DuBow et al., supra note 48, at 286 tbl.30.
53. Research on Sentencing, supra note 6, at 39-40, 133-34.
54. Id. at 40.
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Political and normative developments concerning five subjects-race
relations, proceduralism, civil liberties, rehabilitation, and lenient
judges-were widely understood to have motivated sentencing law reformers. The civil rights movement's concern to reduce racial discrimination percolated through the criminal justice system, first in relation to
prison conditions and subsequently to sentencing. Galvanizing riots in
New York State, most notably at Attica Prison, highlighted the dispropor55
tionate number of blacks in confinement. By 1971, the working group
that wrote the American Friends Service Committee's Struggle for Justice
was convinced that racial discrimination was a driving force behind imit
prisonment disparities and that the only way to ameliorate or eliminate
56
was to remove judges' and parole boards' discretion to discriminate.
Second, prognosticated by Charles Reich's classic article The New
Property,57 and exemplified by Goldberg-a decision accepting Reich's ar58
gument about welfare entitlements -the procedural rights movement
emerged. The notion that government cannot invade primary personal
interests except in accord with established procedural protections soon
reached the criminal justice system. Kenneth Culp Davis famously observed that fair procedures were conspicuously absent from prosecutorial,
judicial, correctional, and parole decisionmaking and argued that such
discretionary decisions affecting liberty should be guided and structured. 59 In due course, the Supreme Court held that fair procedures
61
60
must be observed in parole decisions, prison disciplinary decisions,
62
The discretions not reached were
and probation or parole revocation.
55. Cf. Bert Useem & Peter Kimball, States of Siege 219, 225 (1993) (noting that riots
were in part galvanized by external groups agitating against rise in black prison
populations, and speculating on implications of riots for black communities).
56. See Am. Friends Serv. Comm., supra note 12, at 107-12, 143-44.
57. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964) (demonstrating that
most citizens' important material interests relate to benefit claims against the government,
and arguing that those claims warrant the same legal status as claims to tangible and
traditional intangible properties).
58. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that entitlements could not be
taken away unless specified rudimentary procedural protections were observed).
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See generally Davis, supra note 3.
60. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 16
(1979) (reaffirming that "[t]he Due Process Clause applies when government action
deprives a person of liberty or property" but deeming Nebraska's procedures in instant
case sufficient to satisfy due process requirements).
61. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480, 483-84 (1995) (holding that "[tihe Due
Process Clause standing alone confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action
taken within the sentence imposed" (internal quotation marks omitted), but that "[s] tates
may under certain circumstances create liberty inte rests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause").
62. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (concluding that procedures
outlined in Morrissey for parole revocation should also apply to probation proceedings);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("[T]he liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination
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those of prosecutors and judges. 63 At least for judges, the sentencing reform movement aimed to set that oversight right.
Third, constituting the substantive version of the procedural justice
argument, concerns were soon expressed, most famously by Judge Frankel, that the absence of substantive standards for sentencing and fair procedures to assure their just application produced unwarranted sentencing disparities. 64 The subtitle of his book was "Law Without Order" and
65
within it he referred to American sentencing as "lawless."
Fourth, the preceding developments focused attention on the medical-model rationale of indeterminate sentencing-the claim that officials
had to operate within wide discretionary bounds so that they could make
individualized decisions about the rehabilitation (or its absence) of individual offenders. The necessary, if for too long unexamined, assumption
was that judges and corrections officials had access to effective rehabilitative programs and knew how to classify offenders so they would get the
treatment needed to turn them into law-abiding citizens. Literature reviews cast doubt on those assumptions and few people continued to claim
66
that officials possessed those resources or skills.
Fifth, constituting in retrospect a camel's nose under the tent, social
conservatives, presumably concerned about rising crime rates (but often
with more cynical motives) decried the "lenience" of prevailing sentencing and parole practices, and saw determinate sentencing as a way to ensure that judges imposed appropriate sentences that would not be second
guessed by parole boards. 6 7 Barry Goldwater raised "crime in the streets"
inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on others.... Its termination calls for
some orderly process, however informal.").
63. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) ("As a general proposition,
a sentencing judge 'may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which
it may come."' (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)));
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
64. Frankel, supra note 9, at 5 ("[M]y first basic point is this: the almost wholly
unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are
terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.").
65. See id. at ix-x.
66. See, e.g., James Robison & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Programs, 17 Crime & Delinq. 67, 80 (1971) ("There is no evidence to support any
[California correctional] program's claims of superior rehabilitative efficacy." (emphasis
omitted)); Martinson, supra note 16, at 22-23, 49 (reviewing data from over two hundred
studies and finding "very little reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of
reducing recidivism through rehabilitation").
67. Kevin Phillips, at its inception, and Thomas and Mary Edsall after its successful
execution, describe the strategy of the ultraconservative wing of the Republican Party to
use crime, welfare, and affirmative action as "wedge issues" to convert the Southern white
Democratic voters into Nixon and later Reagan Democrats. See generally Thomas Byrne
Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on
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as a campaign issue in the 1964 presidential election, and Richard Nixon
followed suit in 1968 and 1972; calls for increased toughness characterized every subsequent presidential election until Bill Clinton nullified its
emotive force by refusing to let Republicans get to his right on law and
order. 68 The leading policy history of the adoption of California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law of 1976 describes the police unions,
social conservatives, and prisoners' rights and civil liberties groups that
improbably coalesced to support the new law. 69 The most influential
crime policy book of the 1970s and 1980s provided an intellectual case
for harsher and more certain punishments. 70 Those armies of the night
have marched ever since.
In retrospect, 1975-1985 was the period of ferment, and the pace of
innovation slowed thereafter. A single approach to sentencing no longer
characterizes the United States. 7 ' All states have adopted mandatory
minimum sentence laws, more than half have three strikes laws, and a
third have abolished parole release. 72 Those laws, however, coexist in
some states with statutory determinate sentencing and sentencing guidelines of various sorts and in others with largely intact indeterminate sen73
tencing institutions and practices.
The preceding constitutes a plausible account of the normative and
policy developments that motivated at least the early years of recent sentencing policy changes. The next Part looks at the empirical evidence
and policy concerns that inspired the early sentencing movement, and
examines how the world has since changed.

American Politics 190-92, 214, 224-25 (1991); Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican
Majority 471 (1969) ("The emerging Republican majority spoke clearly in 1968 for a shift
away from the sociological jurisprudence, moral permissiveness, experimental residential,
welfare and educational programing [sic] and massive federal spending by which the
Liberal (mostly Democratic) Establishment sought to propagate liberal institutions and
ideology.").
68. Ted Gest, Crime & Politics: Big Government's Erratic Campaign for Law and
Order 223 (2001) ("Determined to seize on Bush's unexpected weakness on the crimepolicy front, Clinton made a hard-nosed attack a centerpiece of his 'New Democrat'
campaign for the White House in 1992.").
69. See Sheldon L. Messinger & Philip E. Johnson, California's Determinate
Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, in Determinate Sentencing: Reform or
Regression? 13, 21-29 (1978).
70. See James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 162-82 (1975).
71. Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in
Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries 222, 253 (Michael Tonry & Richard S.
Frase eds., 2001) (concluding that "U.S. jurisdictions are notable for their diversity of
approaches, much more so than for their similarities").
72. See Research on Sentencing, supra note 6, at 132-35 (discussing mandatory
minimum sentences and abolition of parole); Shane-DuBow et al., supra note 48, at 286
tbl.30 (highlighting mandatory terms for certain offenders).
73. See Reitz, supra note 71, at 222-33 (providing an overview of U.S. sentencing
practices); Tonry, Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 1-6.
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THE (RELEVANT BITS OF) THE WORLD CHANGED
FROM 1975 TO 2005

Many of the background conditions that catalyzed the sentencing
policy reforms of the 1970s have fundamentally changed; it is reasonable
to expect prevalent attitudes and beliefs to change with them. In particular, changes regarding five background conditions stand out: crime
trends, support for rehabilitative programs, concerns about racial disparities, fairness, and disparities in sentencing. Comparing 2005 with 1975,
crime rates are falling not rising, support for rehabilitation is increasing
rather than decreasing, and concerns about racial and other sentencing
disparities and fairness are far less acute than they once were.
A. Crime Rates
Crime rates in 1975 had been rising for over a decade; by 2005, they
had been declining for at least fifteen years. Tables 1 and 2 tell the story.
TABLE 1: POLICE-RECORDED OFFENSE RATES, PER 100,000 POPULATION,

1960-200374
Violent
Crime

Murder

Robbery

Burglary

Motor
Vehicle Theft

1960

161

5.1

60

509

183

1964

191

4.9

68

635

247

1968

298

6.9

132

932

393

1972

401

9.0

181

1141

426

1976

468

8.8

199

1448

450

1980

597

10.2

251

1684

502

1984

540

7.9

206

1266

438

1988

641

8.5

222

1316

586

1992

758

9.3

264

1168

632

1996

637

7.4

202

945

526

2000

506

5.5

145

729

412

2002

495

5.6

146

746

432

200375

475

5.7

142

741

433

74. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics Online tbl.3.103, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t3103.pdf
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter BJS,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice]; FBI, Crime in the United States: 2004 Preliminary (Dec.
13, 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/2004/6mosprelimO4.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter FBI, Crime 2004].
75. See FBI, Crime in the United States: 2003, § II, at 11, 15, 31, 37, 55 (2004),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ciusO3/pdf/3sec2.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter FBI, Crime 2003].
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TABLE 2: VICTIMIZATION RATES-SELECTED OFFENSES, 1975-2003
Part A.

1975-1991,
Rates per 1,000 Households or per 1,000 Individuals Twelve and
76
Over

Any
Violent
Crimet

Robberyt

Aggravated
Assaultt

Household
Burglary*

Motor
Vehicle
Theft*

1975
1978

32.8

6.8

9.6

91.7

19.5

33.7

5.9

9.7

86.0

17.5

1981

35.3

7.4

9.6

87.9

17.1

1984

31.4

5.7

9.0

64.1

15.2

1987

29.3

5.3

8.0

62.1

16.0

1989

29.1

5.4

8.3

56.4

19.2

1991

31.3

5.6

7.8

53.1

21.8

t per 1,000 households
* per 1,000 individuals aged twelve and over

Part B.

1994-2003, Percentageof Households Reporting at Least One Incident
Any NCVS
Crime

Violence

1994

25.0

7.0

77

Robbery

Aggravated
Assault

Household
Burglary

Motor
Vehicle
Theft

1.0

1.9

4.6

1.7

1997

20.9

5.5

0.7

1.4

3.7

1.2

2000

16.2

3.9

0.5

0.9

2.7

0.8

2002

14.6

3.2

0.4

0.7

2.4

0.8

2003

14.7

3.0

0.4

0.7

2.6

0.8

Table 1 shows offenses recorded by the police between 1960 and
2002 for all violent crimes, murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. I selected these offenses to reflect trends in serious violent and property offenses and to minimize distortions resulting from cultural changes that influence citizen reporting
and police recording of alleged crimes. For example, declining tolerance
of sexual and violent offenses has increased citizen reporting and police
recording of certain crimes, such as aggravated assault. 78 These phenomena have led to an artificial increase in apparent offending rates. 79
The data in Table 1 tell two well-known stories. First, police-recorded crime rates for all offenses increased steadily from the early 1960s
76. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 1992, at 245 tbl.3.2 (Kathleen Maguire-et al. eds., 1993); Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Sourcebook of Criminal justice Statistics 1990, at 252 tbl.3.2
(Kathleen Maguire & TimothyJ. Flanagan eds., 1991).
77. BJS, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at tbl.3.30.
78. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996,
26 Crime &Just. 17, 54 (1999).
79. Id.
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through the early 1980s, declined through the mid-1980s, rose until the
early 1990s, and thereafter fell steadily and precipitously through 2003.80
Rates for 2003 for the individual offenses were the lowest since various
years in the 1960s: murder (1966), robbery (1968), burglary (1966), and
motor vehicle theft (1968).81
Second, when the sentencing reform initiative of the mid-1970s took
hold, crime rates had been rising for fifteen years. By contrast, in 2005
the crime rate has been in decline for fifteen years if the continuous decline since 1991 is deemed the appropriate measure, or for twenty-five
years if the short upturn in the late 1980s is disregarded.
As Table 2 shows, the trends revealed by the police data can be substantiated with data from the National Crime Victimization Survey-a victimization survey of 40,000-60,000 households carried out every six
months. Because major methodological changes to the survey were made
in the early 1990s to capture and measure domestic assaults more accurately, Table 2 is split into two parts.
Part A presents data from 1975-1991 on burglary and motor vehicle
theft rates per one thousand households and aggregate violent crime,
robbery, and aggravated assault rates per one thousand individuals aged
twelve and over. Burglary victimization rates declined continuously and
steeply. Robbery and aggravated assault rates, as in the police data, rose
through 1981 and then fell. Motor vehicle theft rates, again as in the
police data, rose, fell, and then rose again.
The data listed in Part B are expressed per one thousand households
and are derived from the altered methodology. Consequently, the data
cannot be strictly compared with those presented in Part A. Nevertheless,
Part B shows continuous and steep declines since 1994 in victimization
rates for all four offenses and in the aggregate for violence and "any
crime."
This difference in crime trends between the 1970s and the first decade of the twenty-first century is important. We know with some confidence that in relation to drug crime, and more speculatively in relation to
other crimes, public attitudes become less vindictive and uncompromising at times when the incidence of deviant behavior has been declining
for a considerable period.8 2 A window of opportunity has thus opened
80. Compared with 2003, preliminary data for the first six months of 2004 show
continued year-on-year declines of about five percent for murder and robbery, and two
percent for burglary and motor vehicle theft. See FBI, Crime 2004, supra note 74, at 3, 5,
8, 10 (listing data for murder, robbery, burglary, and vehicle theft, respectively).
81. Compare BJS, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice, supra note 74, at tbl.3.103, with
FBI, Crime 2003, supra note 75, § II, at 70 tbl.1.
82. See Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at 97-139 (describing relationship between
crime trends and crime control policies); supra text accompanying note 46 (noting that
initial stages of a falling incidence of deviant behavior may be associated with public
overreaction). Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at 21-96, develops this analysis, and the
evidence and analyses on which it is based, at some length.
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for the adoption and execution of more humane social policies. This is a
83
point to which I return below.
B. Rehabilitation
Although it was not widely recognized at the time, by 1975, confidence in the efficacy of rehabilitative programs had been on the decline
for decades, and the prevailing evaluation of the empirical evidence suggested that rehabilitation did not work. By contrast, in 2005, faith in rehabilitation has been increasing for decades, and the prevailing empirical
evidence suggests that a wide range of treatment programs can reduce
the likelihood of recidivism.
Although Robert Martinson's famous article, What Works-Questions
and Answers About Prison Reform, was not published in The Public Interest
until 1974, the harbingers of decline in faith in the rehabilitative ideal
were evident earlier. Early in the 1950s in Australia, C.S. Lewis-writing
as a Christian apologist and Kantian moralist-and Norval Morris-writing as a liberal lawyer-raised normative objections to efforts coercively
to change people in the pursuit of crime prevention.8 4 Soon after, Fran85
cis A. Allen raised similar objections in the United States.
Skepticism about the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs significandy preceded Martinson's article, which was itself a byproduct of a literature review commissioned by New York State in the late 1960s. 86 The
California Department of Corrections had earlier commissioned a similar
review of the evidence; a summary was published in 1971.87
Thus, what to many seemed to constitute a stunning turn in direction away from indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitative ideal was
simply an acknowledgment of normative doubts and empirical skepticism
that had been bubbling away for decades.8 8 That is not to say no one
continued to support rehabilitative goals and programs; some did.8 9
83. See infra Part IV.B.
84. See generally Lewis, supra note 19; Morris, Sentencing, supra note 19.
85. See Allen, Criminal Justice, supra note 19, at 229-32 (criticizing shortcomings of
"rehabilitative ideal in the areas of corrections and criminal justice"); Allen, Legal Values,
supra note 1, at 25-41 (reexamining rehabilitative ideal).
86. This study eventually was published in full. Douglas Lipton et al., The
Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies
(1975).
87. See Robison & Smith, supra note 66.
88. The American Law Institute, however, seems not to have noticed: In 1962, it
approved the Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code, which recommended a
refined system of indeterminate sentencing premised primarily on rehabilitative aims.
Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at 176-86.
89. See, e.g., F.T. Cullen & K.E. Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation 246-91 (1982)
("[I] t is our firm belief that the most promising option for liberal reform is to reaffirm and
not to reject the ideology of criminal justice rehabilitation."); Ted Palmer, Martinson
Revisited, 12J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 133, 149-51 (1975) (arguing that Martinson's study
challenging effectiveness of rehabilitative measures in fact contained evidence that some
rehabilitative methods were effective for at least some types of offenders).
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However, the eventual post-Martinson review of rehabilitative programs
by the National Academy of Sciences, which broadly confirmed Martinson's skeptical conclusions, was plowing well-tilled soil. 90
In 2005, things look very different. Numerous literature reviews, 91
meta-analyses, 92 and government reports93 proclaim the effectiveness of a
wide range of treatment programs. They uniformly insist that programs
must be well-targeted and well-implemented but, assuming those (difficult to satisfy) conditions can be met, they almost always conclude that
rehabilitative programs can significantly reduce reoffending.
Taking such findings seriously, a recent English government report,
which served as the foundation for a massive overhaul of the English
criminal justice system, 9 4 observed in its executive summary, "The available evidence suggests that greater support for reform and rehabilitation
... to reduce risks of offending, offers the best prospects for improved
outcomes. 9 5 The body of the report explained why: "A reasonable estimate at this stage is that, if the programmes are developed and applied as
intended, to the maximum extent possible, reconviction rates might be
90. See Panel on Research on Rehabilitative Techniques, Report of the Panel, in The
Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: Problems and Prospects 3, 29-34 (Lee Sechrest et
al. eds., 1979).
91. See, e.g., M. Douglas Anglin & Yih-Ing Hser, Treatment of Drug Abuse, 13 Crime
&Just. 393, 394 (1990) (insisting "greater social investment in treatment may be the most
cost-effective way to achieve [the] public policy goals" of reducing drug use and thereby
reducing the user's criminal activity); Gerald G. Gaes et al., Adult Correctional Treatment,
26 Crime & Just. 361, 366-411 (1999) (summarizing and offering general critique of
correctional treatment literature).
92. See, e.g., Mark W. Lipsey, What Do We Learn from 400 Research Studies on the
Effectiveness of Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents?, in What Works: Reducing
Reoffending 63, 78 (James McGuire ed., 1995) [hereinafter What Works] (concluding "[i]t
is no longer constructive . . .to argue about whether delinquency treatment and related
rehabilitative approaches 'work"' because "[a]s a generality, treatment clearly works");
Friedrich L6sel, The Efficacy of Correctional Treatment: A Review and Synthesis of MetaEvaluations, in What Works, supra, at 79, 103 (concluding "it will be worthwhile to
continue along [the] path" of rehabilitative offender treatment).
93. See, e.g., President's Comm'n on Model State Drug Laws, The White House, Final
Report-Executive Summary 2 (Dec. 1993) (recommending sanctions "designed to be
constructive, attempting to leverage alcohol and other drug abusers into treatment,
rehabilitation, and ultimately, recovery"); U.S. Surgeon Gen., Youth Violence: A Report of
the Surgeon General ch. 5 (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
youthviolence/toc.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (asserting that "effective
treatment can divert a significant proportion of delinquent and violent youths from future
violence and crime").
94. The Halliday Report, the foundation document upon which the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 builds, discusses the new initiatives and the issues they raise. See John Halliday et
al., Home Office, Making Punishments Work: Report of a Review of the Sentencing
Framework for England and Wales passim (2001); see also Michael Tonry, Punishment and
Politics: Evidence and Emulation in the Making of English Crime Control Policy 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Tonry, Punishment].
95. Halliday et al., supra note 94, 0.4.
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reduced by five to fifteen percentage points (i.e. from the present level of
56% within two years to (perhaps) 40%)."96
Halliday's predictions are no doubt optimistic, but they do reflect a
sea change in attitudes toward rehabilitation. Where a quarter of a century ago public officials and researchers were predisposed to pessimism,
the modern predisposition is otherwise. This is important because, while
the pessimism of the mid-1970s rested comfortably with normative arguments that sentencing should be backward-looking and predicated on
ideas about proportionality, modern optimism can easily be reconciled
with other views.
C. Racial Disparities
Concerns about racial discrimination and disparities in the criminal
justice system were major challenges to the legitimacy of indeterminate
sentencing in the 1970s. By 2005, they have largely disappeared as major
considerations in the formulation of sentencing policy.
The civil rights movement reached full stride in the 1960s, searing
the nation's conscience; making national celebrities of people as diverse
as Martin Luther King, Jr., Julian Bond, Bobby Seal, and Stokely Carmichael; and fundamentally challenging the ways America organized and
distributed education, housing, and social welfare. Perhaps a bit surprisingly in retrospect, because real and alleged criminals seldom elicit widespread solicitude, the movement included the police, courts, and prisons
within its focus. It gave rise, among other things, to the prisoners' rights
movement 9 7 and to fundamental critiques of the capacity of indeterminate sentencing to deal with offenders fairly and evenhandedly. 98 The
capacity of every judge, probation officer, prison system, and parole
board to exercise individualized discretion within broad ranges of authority created nearly limitless risks of contamination of decisions by deliberate racial animus and unconscious stereotyping.
America is a different place in terms of race relations and equal opportunity in 2005 than it was in 1975, even though aspirations for racial
equality remain in important respects insufficiently satisfied. Still, it
would not be unreasonable to suppose that problems of racial disparity
and discrimination in the criminal justice system are less acute. It would
not be unreasonable, but it would be wrong. Racial disparities in impris96. Id. at 7. This is even more heroic than it appears because of the way Halliday
presents the numbers. A reduction from fifty-six percent reconviction within two years to
forty percent is a twenty-seven percent reduction relative to the starting point.
97. E.g.,James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-80, 2
Crime & Just. 429, 436-37 (1980) (suggesting the civil rights movement aroused the
consciousness of minority prisoners and was the impetus for the ensuing prisoners' rights
movement).
98. See, e.g., Am. Friends Serv. Comm., supra note 12, at 67-82 (highlighting
preventive detention through indeterminate sentencing as "particularly vivid example of
depersonalization" and "a major setback in the struggle for justice").
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onment are worse in the early years of the twenty-first century than they
were in the 1970s.
Table 3, showing the percentages of blacks among state and federal
prison inmates, tells the tale. In 1970, in the bad old days, 41% of prison
inmates were black. By 1980, the percentage had climbed to 44% and by
1986 to 46%. By 1990, it was 49%, around which it has since hovered,
occasionally slightly exceeding 50%. 99
TABLE

3:

PERCENTAGE OF BLACK STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS IN
SELECTED YEARS, 1960-2002.100
Year

Percentage Black

1960

37

1970

41

1975*

42.5

1980

44

1985

45.9

1990

49.2

1995

49.9

2002*

49.4

Estimated from published sources.

Racial disparities in imprisonment can be expressed in other ways.
On December 1, 2002, 3.4% of black American men were prison inmates
99. Before the mid-1990s, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), like the U.S. Bureau
of the Census, used "black," "white," and "other" to characterize race, and separately
counted Hispanics and non-Hispanics. More recently, the BJS reports "race" data for
whites, blacks, and Hispanics. Approximately one-fourth of Hispanics were formerly
counted as "black," and I have adjusted the 2002 figure in table 3 to take account of this.
The official BJS report for 1997 lists the percentage of black inmates, including Hispanic
blacks, as 49.9% in 1995; the 2003 BJS report lists the percentage of black inmates, not
including Hispanics, as 45.7% in 1995. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Prisoners in 2002, at 9 (July 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/p02.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter BJS, Prisoners 2002];
Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Prisoners in 1996, at 9 tbl.11 (June 1997),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p96.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter BJS, Prisoners 1996]. In 1995, 17.6% of prisoners were reported
to be Hispanic, which means that about a fourth (4.4%) were previously counted among
black prisoners; in 2002, 18.1% were Hispanic. See BJS, Prisoners 2002, supra, at 9. See
generally Tonry, Malign Neglect, supra note 46, at 49-123 (providing more detailed data
on racial trends in crime and punishment).
100. BJS, Prisoners 2002, supra note 99, at 9 tbl.13; BJS, Prisoners 1996, supra note 99,
at 9 tbl.11; Margaret Werner Cahalan, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Historical Corrections Statistics
in the United States, 1850-1984, at 65 tbl.3-31 (1986). For how 2002 percentages are
calculated, see supra note 99.
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(add jail inmates and the percentage climbs to 4.8%) 10 1 and 10.4% of
black males twenty-five to twenty-nine years old were in prison. Relative
to population, black men in 2002 were 7.6 times likelier to be in prison
than white men, and black women 5.5 times likelier than white
102
women.
However the phenomenon is characterized, racial disparities in imprisonment-and the damage they do to black people's lives and life
chances-have not diminished over the past thirty years. They have
worsened.
We know why the black presence in American prisons increased so
greatly in the 1980s. The problem was not an increase in biased decisionmaking in individual cases. 103 Nor did it occur because blacks' involvement in serious crimes increased. 10 4 The increase was instead the foreseeable consequence of conscious policy decisions to focus on street-level
trafficking in the War on Drugs and on street-level violence in the War on
Crime. 10 5 Inner-city drug dealing networks, operating mostly on the
streets and in deteriorated neighborhoods, are much easier to penetrate,
and dealers are much easier to arrest, than are middle-class drug dealers
working behind doors and in less penetrable settings. Among people arrested for violent crimes, blacks, who make up 13% of the U.S. population, are heavily overrepresented. In 2003, 48.5% of those arrested for
murder were black, and the figures for other serious violent crimes were
also disproportionately high: forcible rape (33.3%), robbery (54.4%),
and aggravated assault (33.0%).106 Policies meant to increase the severity
of punishments for violent crimes will, in the nature of things, disproportionately affect black offenders.

101. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of justice, Prison and Jail Inmates at
Midyear 2002, at 11 tbl.14 (April 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/pjim02.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
102. See BJS, Prisoners 2002, supra note 99, at 9 tbl.14.
103. See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 352 (1997) (arguing that, in
regard to charges of selective prosecution, "allegations of racial discrimination have been
insufficiently substantiated"). See generally Tonry, Malign Neglect, supra note 46, 68-74
(documenting and discussing racial disproportion in criminal justice system and racially
disproportionate effects of war on drugs).
104. See infra note 106.
105. See Tonry, Malign Neglect, supra note 46, at 104-16; Tonry, Thinking, supra
note 18, at 130-39.
106. FBI, Crime 2003, supra note 75, at 288 tbl.43. FBI arrest data, unlike BJS prison
data, continue to use a "black," "white," and "other" racial breakdown, and thus include
Hispanics within the "black" and "white" classifications. Although blacks' shares among
arrests for violent crimes are disproportionately high, they have declined substantially.
The black share of homicide arrests in 2003 (48.5%) is much lower than in 1992 (55.1%),
1982 (49.7%), and 1976 (53.5%). The patterns from 2003, 1992, 1982, and 1976, for
robbery (51.8%, 60.9%, 60.7%, 59.2%), rape (33.3%, 42.8%, 49.7%, 51.2%), and
aggravated assault (32.2%, 38.3%, 38.8%, 41.0%) are similar. See id.; Tonry, Malign
Neglect, supra note 46, at 64 tbl.2-2.
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Although racial disparities have worsened, concern about them has
abated and is no longer a major pressure on the shaping of sentencing
and penal policies.10 7 This is important because concern about racial disparities was a major impetus to sentencing initiatives that sought to reduce and constrain officials' exercise of discretion, and consequently
rested comfortably with desert theories aimed at making sentences proportionate and predictable.
D. Sentencing Disparities
There was also widespread concern about sentencing disparities generally during the 1970s. The earliest reform initiatives were heavily motivated by the desire to reduce unwarranted disparities because they were
unjust. That was the gravamen of Judge Marvin Frankel's proposal for
creation of sentencing commissions 08 and of a series of other contemporaneous and, for a time, influential books. 10 9 However, substantive concern about disparities seems largely to have disappeared. This can be
shown in several ways.
First, although sentencing commissions have been attempted or institutionalized in more than twenty states and the federal system, the time
is long past when they were motivated primarily by a desire to reduce
disparities and discrimination. 1 0° Most contemporary systems are motivated either to achieve "truth in sentencing" or to make sentencing outcomes predictable so that correctional resource needs can be predicted
and managed. Seeking truth in sentencing, however, is not at all the
same as trying to reduce disparities. Generally, truth in sentencing-usually involving abolition of parole release, time off for good behavior
(good time), or both-aims to assure that whatever sentence the judge
imposes is carried out. Whether the sentence is appropriate or proportionate is an altogether separate matter. Virginia's guidelines, for example, aim to reduce crime through the incapacitation of higher-rate offenders and offenders with predicted long residual offending careers, an
107. Racial disparities in capital punishment and allegations of racial profiling by
police continue to galvanize powerful emotions and concern, but disparities in sentencing
and imprisonment do not. The federal government's sustained failure to repeal or amend
the notorious 100-to-i law, which punishes traffickers in crack cocaine-mostly black-as
much as traffickers in powder cocaine who deal in amounts 100 times larger, is one
example. See, e.g., Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at 4, 15; see also supra p. 1255 tbl.3
(displaying data on black imprisonment rates).
108. See Frankel, supra note 9, at 3-11.
109. See, e.g., David Fogel, ". . . We Are the Living Proof.. .": The Justice Model for
Corrections 192-93 (1975) (describing sentencing system as "anomic" and challenging its
fairness).
110. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1204-06 n.72-80 (2005) (explaining
new reasons for sentencing commissions); Reitz, supra note 71, at 225-28 (describing
changes in motivations for sentencing commissions).
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approach that inherently has nothing whatsoever to do with horizontal
equity for people convicted of comparable crimes." 1
Nor does efficient management of correctional resources imply
much about sentencing disparities. The goal of such an approach is to
make sentences predictable, which implies making them consistent
within categories. Unlike Judge Frankel's normative approach, efficiency
constitutes both a backdoor and an instrumental goal: Sentences should
be made consistent because that makes them predictable and therefore
makes resource allocation decisions better informed. That is some distance from the normative claim that sentences should be made consistent
2
because inconsistent sentences are unjust."1
Second, it has been several decades since policymakers showed much
concern about sentencing disparities. Most of the ballyhooed sentencing
initiatives of the past twenty years-three strikes rules, mandatory minimums, sexual psychopath laws, and truth in sentencing-display no sensitivity to proportionality and consistency. Mandatory minimum sentences
for drug crimes, for example, often require imposition of longer
sentences than are received by people convicted of serious violent and
sexual crimes. California's Three Strikes, for another example, requires
minimum twenty-five-year-to-life sentences following any third felony conviction, including (notoriously) trivial drug and property offenses, thus
defying all conventional notions of proportionality and consistency.11 3
Third, everything we know about the operation of severe mandatory
sentences instructs that they increase disparities in the handling of similar
cases. In California, for example, there are enormous differences in the
extent to which prosecutors in different cities invoke the third-strike provisions, which means defendants in some cities will receive twenty-five
year sentences for crimes for which offenders in other cities receive much
lesser sentences.' 14 More generally, several centuries of experience and
evidence show that mandatory penalties foreseeably provoke adaptive responses and circumvention by judges and other practitioners to save offenders from sentences that everyone involved considers unduly harsh." 15
As a result, among like-situated offenders, some will be sentenced as the
111. See Va. Crim. Sentencing Comm'n, 1997 Annual Report 41-60 (detailing new
risk assessment instrument designed for integration into existing guidelines system, with
primary purpose of assessing probability of reconviction for felony crime within three year
period).
112. Policy makers could, for example, decide that convicted offenders who are
noncitizens (or Muslim or black or female) should always be sentenced to terms twice
those of citizens, non-Muslims, whites, or men. Such a policy, consistently applied, would
make sentences predictable, but it would be far from just.
113. Zimring et al., supra note 44, at 117-23.
114. Id. at 81-83 (comparing the number of twenty-five-year-to-life sentences for
third-strike felons in Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco); see supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
115. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 147 (1996).
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will receive a wide range of
mandatory sentence law prescribes and others
1 16
circumvention.
by
possible
made
sentences
This reduced visceral concern for the injustice of imposition of disparate sentences on like-situated offenders is important because it demonstrates the weakening influence of the idea that equality and proportionality are key elements of just punishment.
E. Fairness
This point can be made by affirmation. Concerns for procedural
and substantive fairness in the criminal justice system waxed through the
1970s and have waned ever since. Rawls's notion of 'justice as fair118
ness," 117 made manifest in Dworkin's conception of rights as trumps,
and Dworkin's argument that fairness requires "equal concern and respect" to be shown for the interests of each individual 19 were vital and
influential ideas in relation to the criminal justice system in the 1970s.
They no longer are.
Concern for procedural fairness for criminal suspects and defendants expanded in the 1950s and 1960s under the aegis of the Warren
Court, declined somewhat under the Burger Court, and has declined
markedly under the Rehnquist Court. 120 Concern for substantive fairness, high in the 1970s and exemplified by concerns about racial and
other disparities and ambitions to reduce them, has also since
12 1
declined.
Why these changes happened-why society at large and policymakers in general became less concerned about fairness to offenders and less
able to empathize with the unfortunate and the dispossessed-is a complicated question. Answers range from the simple and simpleminded
(crime rose, people became frightened, policymakers responded 122) to
the eloquent and elegant (conditions of late modernity reshaped sensibilities in relation to tolerance of risk, difference, and confidence in govern-

116. Although evaluations in the early years of implementation of sentencing
guidelines showed that some significantly decreased disparities generally and racial and
gender disparities specifically, the proliferation of mandatory minimum and three strikes
laws, and the adaptive responses they engender, have no doubt greatly increased the
prevalence of sentencing disparities. Id. at 40-49.
117. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 Phil. Rev. 164 (1958).
118. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 184-205 (1977).
119. Id. at 180.
120. See Allen, Habits, supra note 14, at 65 (stating that Warren Court was leader in
development of "constitutional doctrine pertaining to the rights of suspected persons,"
which subsequently was limited by "the restiveness of the modern Court").
121. See supra Part III.C-D.
122. William J. Bennett et al., Body Count: Moral Poverty . . . and How to Win
America's War Against Crime and Drugs 14-17 (1996).
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ment23). None is or can be completely convincing, but all agree that
sensibilities have changed in important ways over the last forty years.
IV. NORMATIVE

CONSEQUENCES

The changes in normative and cultural backdrop sketched in Part III
have important implications for thinking about punishment. They can
help us understand why retributivist ideas about proportionality and desert found receptive minds in the 1970s but find fewer now, and why
thinking about punishment will and should change in coming years. In
refusing to name names to the House Unamerican Activities Committee,
Lillian Hellman famously refused to cut her conscience to fit the fashion
of the times. 124 The prevailing sensibilities of a time do, however,
powerfully shape what people believe and, even more powerfully, what
they say. In the 1980s, many fewer voices were raised against the extraordinarily harsh penalties authorized and imposed in conducting the War
on Drugs than would have been ten or twenty years earlier or than would
be raised in 2005 were they new proposals. Likewise, post-9/11, many
fewer people opposed policies denying basic human rights and procedural protections to alleged national security suspects than would have
before 9/11 or than do in 2005. The fewer, quieter voices of principled
opposition resulted partly from the chilling effect of not wanting to appear unreasonable or radical or naive, but also because in those times on
those issues many more people for a while believed the repressive measures were ethically justifiable and made good policy sense.
And so it is with thinking about punishment. The prevailing structural conditions and sensibilities of a time shape what people think and
believe. Most practitioners and policymakers in the 1950s speculated that
crime was in significant part the deterministic outcome of defective socialization, social disadvantage, and personal pathology, and that the
most ethically defensible punishment policies involved rehabilitation of
125
the corrigible and incapacitation of the rest.
123. See Garland, supra note 17, at 23-24. Less cryptically, Garland suggests that
several major influences are important in a postmodern world of heightened insecurity
and instability: increased and more widely distributed victimization and a heightened
sense of risk, particularly among the privileged; adoption of primarily expressive policies
by governments that recognize there is relatively little they can do about crime but wish to
be seen to be acknowledging public anxiety and insecurity; and reification of typically poor
and often minority offenders as the criminological "other" who can be scapegoated. Id. at
10-20, 135-37.
124. MarkJarman, Ovid, Our Contemporary, Hudson Rev., Summer 2004, available at
http://www.hudsonreview.com/JarmanSu04.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("To paraphrase Lillian Hellman's famous rebuke to the House Unamerican Affairs
Committee, art will not cut its cloth to suit the fashion of the times ....").
125. For an example from England, see Barbara Wootton, Social Science and Social
Pathology 80-135, 334-35 (1959) (reviewing a number of deterministic theories, and
concluding there is "encouraging" evidence that rehabilitation is more successful than
standard forms of punishment). For an American example, see Karl Menninger, The
Crime of Punishment 96-97, 251, 257-64 (1968) (arguing that the existence of free will is
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A. Ideas for the 1970s
The calls for adoption of retributive punishment schemes set out in
Norval Morris's The Future of Imprisonment126 and Andrew von Hirsch's
Doing Justice127 at the time appeared radical. The Model Penal Code's
draftsmen a dozen years earlier, 128 and the Brown Commission (National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) 129 just a few years earlier had called for the creation of full-blown systems of indeterminate sentencing premised on utilitarian ideas. Yet von Hirsch was ready to jettison rehabilitative and other utilitarian goals of punishment, except as
incidental byproducts of the imposition of deserved punishments, and
Morris called for strict limits on and presumptions against their pursuit in
13 0
individual cases.
Academic philosophers beginning in the 1960s and 1970s showed
renewed interest in deontological theories of punishment, 131 although in
retrospect, as I have already shown, precursors to popular acceptance of
desert and proportionality ideas in the mid-1970s can be seen at least
twenty years earlier. 132 The basic ideas expressed in these retributive
punishment theories had been around in well-elaborated form since Kant
and Hegel developed them in the nineteenth century, and were ready to
be taken off the shelf and applied.' 3 3 For most of those years, at least in
the English-speaking countries, they gathered dust.
Glimmerings of interest appeared in the 1950s. Suddenly, in the
1970s, they were taken down and celebrated. Why? Because the times
were ready for them. They fit comfortably with the civil rights movement,
an unproven hypothesis, thus "blame" is an unsound basis for punishment; further arguing
that crime should be treated as an illness, and that rehabilitative treatment for criminals is
both desirable and possible).
126. See Morris, Future, supra note 2, at 58 (rejecting rehabilitation in favor of
retribution and deterrence).
127. See von Hirsch, Justice, supra note 2, at 11-18 (criticizing rehabilitation as
preeminent goal of punishment).
128. See Model Penal Code § 6.02 cmt. 9 (1985) ("When Section 6.06 was discussed
and approved by the Institute [in 1962] there was little dissent from the objectives of
having some judicial discretion in choice of sentence and considerable indeterminacy of
prison terms.").
129. Nat'l Comm'n on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws, Proposed New Federal
Criminal Code § 3201(2) & crt. (1971).
130. See Morris, Future, supra note 2, at 15, 18 (arguing that "rehabilitation can be
given only to a volunteer" and that "sentencing judge should never extend a term of
imprisonment, or impose a term of imprisonment, on the basis that the offender needs it
for his retraining"); von Hirsch, Justice, supra note 2, at 11-18 (criticizing rehabilitation);
id. at 127-30 (arguing that even if rehabilitation were to be effective, with few exceptions,
principle of commensurate deserts should define limit of punishment).
131. See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475, 476 (1968)
(arguing that humans have right to punishment that stems from "a fundamental human
right to be treated as a person"); Murphy, Marxism, supra note 35, at 222 (proposing that
retributive theory of punishment is reasonable and morally justifiable).
132. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 27.
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the prisoners' rights movement, the procedural rights movement, the
elaboration of rights theories in philosophy by Rawls, Dworkin, and
others, and the decline in confidence in the ethics and efficacy of rehabilitative programs. They provided a logical and a normative rationale for
punishment schemes that could constrain officials' discretion and ameliorate racial bias and disparities of various sorts. Because retributive ideas
fit so comfortably with the policy and normative imperatives of the 1970s
and early 1980s, they escaped some of the scrutiny to which a less predisposed age would have subjected them.
Andrew von Hirsch is the paradigmatic writer in the modem retributive tradition. Professional philosophers have written creatively on this
subject, if often rather abstrusely. Von Hirsch, however, has tried to develop an applied philosophy to address practical policy choices in an imperfect world;' 3 4 I use some of his ideas to show the limits of retributive
theories, starting with the most familiar. There are six major problems of
successively greater importance.
First, in the initial iteration of von Hirsch's ideas in DoingJustice, it
was unclear why he adopted retribution in determination of the amount
of punishment as a defining principle at all. H.L.A. Hart had, to most
people's satisfaction, explained that punishment theories need to address
three different subjects: Justification-why punish at all? Liabilitywhom to punish? Amount-how much to punish?135 Hart suggested
that the three questions can coherently be answered in different ways.
For example, for Hart himself, if general prevention, a utilitarian aim,
were to be the justification for punishment, retribution often would be at
13 6
least part of the rationale for decisions about liability and amount.
13 7
Norval Morris also relies on general prevention
but argues that the
concept of desert should be used in defining the maximum amount of
punishment appropriate.' 38 Some justifications, however, might entail
(that is, logically require) specific answers to the other questions. A thorough-going retributivist, for example, like Kant or Hegel, for whom the
justification of punishment is positive retribution (that is, a belief that it is
morally required that offenders be punished in strict proportion to their
culpability) would have difficulty coherently offering other than positive
39
retributivist answers to the other two questions.'
Von Hirsch adopted a positive retributivist position on amounts of
punishment that could justly be imposed, but gave an unsatisfactory ex134. See von Hirsch, Justice, supra note 2, at 6 (describing his book as an attempt to
"provide a structure of ideas, against which specific programs may be judged," and
acknowledging that "reformers, pursuing the practical business of change, have to
accommodate their aims to political and institutional realities").
135. See Hart, supra note 1, at 3.
136. See id. at 9.
137. See Morris, Future, supra note 2, at 79.
138. See id. at 74-75.
139. In positive retributivist accounts, the deserved punishment must be imposed. In
negative retributivist accounts, punishment may be imposed up to the deserved amount.
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planation as to why. 140 The stance was not entailed in the justification he
offered for punishment as an institution: an amalgamation of
Benthamite utilitarian ideas and general prevention with retributive ideas
about moral desert. 14 1 Von Hirsch's justification could easily have accommodated utilitarian goals in distribution (liability and amount combined), but he opted instead for a strict desert scheme. Although he later
recanted it, he offered as a partial justification for the existence of punishment the benefits-and-burdens claim that offenders, who by offending
have unfairly benefited from others' compliance with the social contract,
must be subjected to offsetting burdens so as to restore social equilibrium. 1 4 2 In later writings, von Hirsch abandoned the benefits-and-burdens argument in favor of a censure theory which posits that respect for
offenders' moral autonomy requires that we blame them for their wrongdoing in proportion to the moral gravity of the wrong. 14 3 All of his arguments are graceful and persuasive, and suggest a powerful intuitive commitment to retributive ideas and values. What isn't clear, and isn't
required by the punishment justification he offered, is why he held that
intuition so strongly.
Second, even assuming retribution in distribution is appropriate,
there is a classic epistemological problem. How do we know how much
censure, or "deserved punishment," a particular wrongdoer absolutely deserves? God may know, but as countless sentencing exercises have shown,
people's intuitions about individual cases vary widely. Von Hirsch conceded that questions of "cardinal desert" are beyond us, but offered as a
144
practical equivalent what he called "ordinal desert."
An ordinal desert scheme ranks crimes by their comparative generic
seriousness, ranks punishments by their comparative severity, sets
"anchoring points" specifying the tops and bottoms of the punishment
scale, and lines the two scales up against one another. There are still
some well-known problems such as determining the anchoring points,
the number of steps in the two scales, and the intervals between steps, but
the scheme does what von Hirsch wanted it to do. What isn't clear is why
he wanted to do it.
140. See von Hirsch, Justice, supra note 2, at 69 ("The principle of commensurate
deserts, in our opinion, is a requirement of justice . . ").
141. See id. at 49-55 (concluding that criminal sanction rests on interdependent
concepts of deterrence and desert).
142. See id. at 47-48 (emphasizing that Kant's theory explains only why some kind of
deprivation should be suffered by the offender to offset his advantage, not why the
deprivation should take the peculiar form of punishment).
143. Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions 7-14 (1993) [hereinafter von
Hirsch, Censure].
144. Andrew von Hirsch, ast or Future Crimes 44-45 (1985) ("Once, however, the
magnitude and anchoring points of the scale have been chosen (with whatever
uncertainties this choice involves), then the internal scaling requirements of
proportionality-the ordinal requirements-become binding. The imprecision of
cardinal proportionality is not a warrant for infringing on these principles of comparative
scaling.").
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Third, even accepting the logic of ordinal proportionality, is the
problem that Bentham called "sensibility." 145 By this he meant the individual's idiosyncratic and circumstance-dependent susceptibility to pain.
Bentham wanted punishment to be individualized, and wanted the subjective individualized weight of the sanction to be severe enough to deter
that individual and others, and not a bit severer. Severer punishment
than circumstances require would violate the parsimony principle's pro14 6
hibition of needless and hence unjustifiable infliction of pain.
For a variety of reasons, later utilitarian writers rejected the need (or
feasibility) of making interpersonal comparisons of utility,1 47 but it is far
from obvious why a retributive punishment theory would reject interpersonal subjectivity. In everyday life, for example, we all know that a year's
imprisonment will be a different experience in house arrest, a halfway
house, a minimum-security camp for white collar offenders, a mediumsecurity custodial prison, and a twenty-three-hour-a-day lockdown supermaximum security prison. Within any one of those types of prisons, the
experience will differ for a recidivist gang member, a twenty-year-old middle-class college student, a welfare mom, a forty-year-old head of household, and a terminally ill septuagenarian. And beyond all that, the experience will vary with the individual's psychological robustness and
vulnerabilities.
Fourth, the ordinal desert scheme's reliance on nominal offenses generically ranked presents similar problems. Owing to sentencing concessions awarded to defendants who plead guilty compared with those convicted following a trial, divergent approaches to plea bargaining, and the
widely heterogeneous behaviors that can fall within generic offense definitions (robberies range from schoolyard takings of pizzas by threat to
professional, armed, and elaborately planned operations), a nominal
conviction offense can encompass an enormously wide range of
behaviors.
Fifth, and constituting an important problem seldom discussed, von
Hirsch's scheme falls prey to the classic retributive critique of utilitarian
punishment. It treats offenders as means, not ends.1 48 When a utilitarian
145. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 51
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., University of London 1970) (1789) ("The disposition
which any one has to have the proportion in which he is affected by two such causes,
different from that in which another man is affected by the same two causes, may be
termed the quality or bias of his sensibility.").
146. See Bentham, Rationale, supra note 28, at 23 ("All punishment being in itself
evil, upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.").
147. See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparons of Utility: A Comment, 48
Econ. J. 635, 636-37 (1938) (criticizing interpersonal comparisons of utility in economic
theory).
148. See Pincoffs, Legal Punishment, supra note 1, at 33-37 (critiquing utilitarianism
on ground that it permits punishment of an innocent if such punishment yields more
benefits (measured in terms of deterrence) than harms).
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system holds an offender longer than the gravity of his crime requires to
rehabilitate or incapacitate him, or to deter or morally educate others,
then, and to that extent, it uses him as a means to the ulterior end of
crime prevention.
Von Hirsch's theory does the same thing. Insofar as it ignores offenders' differing sensibilities to pain and employs generic offense definitions to build ordinal punishment scales to set amounts of punishment, it
punishes many offenders more (or less) than they deserve to achieve a
nominally retributive punishment system. The naive defendant who insists on going to trial on a minor robbery charge and is convicted will
receive a much harsher punishment than an experienced offender
charged with a more serious robbery who pleads guilty to a reduced
charge of simple assault. The naive offender is a sacrifice to the formal
149
logic of the punishment scheme.
Sixth, von Hirsch's theory calls for the imposition of unduly harsh
penalties in individual cases, thereby violating the parsimony principle.
This occurs because of interactions among the ordinal desert concept,
reliance on generic offense definitions, and refusal to take account of
interpersonal subjectivities. 150 An offender must be punished as the
scheme prescribes even though the offense was less serious than the average offense of its type, or the offender will, as a subjective matter, suffer
more pain from a generic punishment than would the average offender.
This point is a variation on the preceding critique that von Hirsch's theory uses offenders as means to the end of making practice follow theory.
Offenders will be punished more than would otherwise be deemed appropriate or necessary because that is what the theory calls for.
I have focused solely on von Hirsch because he has been so central
and influential a figure and has illuminated thinking about most of the
hard problems. Other examples can be given, however, of ideal punishment theories shaped to fit the temper of their times. A considerable
number of serious philosophers in the 19 7 0s and 1980s developed retributive punishment theories, even though they felt unable to urge their
adoption in the real world because they were premised on unrealistic and
unattainable assumptions about social justice and equal life chances that
in the real world cannot be satisfied.1 51
149. Plea bargain incentives, of course, exist independently of ordinal desert schemes
and can be subjected to ethical critique independently of them. I use this hypothetical
merely to illustrate that the conviction offense is an artifact, sometimes an arbitrary one, of
plea bargaining and other organizational processes; necessarily, a punishment scheme that
rigidly ties punishment to those artifactual labels often will ignore meaningful differences
between cases.
150. See von Hirsch, Justice, supra note 2, at 133 (suggesting that there could
conceivably be as few as five gradations of seriousness in a penalty scale).
151. For example, Ted Honderich argues,
No doubt punishment raises many questions, but there is nothing that can be
called the question of its moral justification which is left to be considered if one
puts aside the great question of the distribution of goods in society.... Are our
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"Communicative" theories came into vogue in the 1970s and 1980s,
arguing that the aim of punishment is to communicate with the offender,
and sometimes observers, about his or her wrongdoing. 152 Although
often said not to be consequentialist, most such theories were. Whether
the aim is to change the offender's understanding of his behavior per se,
or to make him a right-thinking person less likely to misbehave, both are
sought-after consequences. Some seem motivated to socialize bystanders
into better values (and behavior); those too are sought-after
consequences.
In any case, none of the leading communicative theories eschew
hard treatment for offenders when the logic of its position should so prescribe. When the communication is unnecessary because the offender
has already come to understand the wrongfulness of his act, and to regret
it, hard treatment should be unnecessary. Likewise, if the offender is incorrigible, communication cannot succeed, and if the process is the goal,
there is no point. Even von Hirsch-whose later censure (or blaming)
theory is a variant of communicative theory (to the offender and to the
community) 15 3-calls for hard treatment in every case to give offenders
15 4
and bystanders prudential reasons to behave.
Like the retributive theorists discussed above, those who endorsed
communicative theories also expressed doubts about the possibility of implementation.15 5 What all these examples demonstrate is that punishment theorists in the contemporary sentencing reform era felt obliged to
develop and work out the details of retributive or communicative theories
in which, for use in the real world, they themselves did not really believe.
Von Hirsch's ideas were remarkably influential among policymakers
for at least ten years after he made 'just deserts" into a term of art. The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission explicitly adopted the

contemporary societies directed by the Principle of Equality? Is our punishment
in accord with it? The answer is no, more so in this time than it has recently
been. Does it follow that punishment in our societies lacks moral justification?
That it is wrong? The short answer is yes.
Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications 238-40 (1989); see also
Murphy, Marxism, supra note 35, at 222 (asserting that Marxist analysis of society would
undercut practical applicability of a retributive theory of punishment, however morally
credible the theory may be).

152. See, e.g., Duff, Trials, supra note 34, at 267.
153. See von Hirsch, Censure, supra note 143, at 10 ("Censure addresses the victim.
...Censure also addresses the act's perpetrator.").
154. See id. at 12-13 (noting that hard treatment can provide a morally aware
potential wrongdoer "afurther reason-a prudential one-for resisting the temptation" to
commit a crime).
155. See, e.g., Duff, Trials, supra note 34, at 292 ("But insofar as the society in which
the offender lives does not constitute a genuine community, united by shared values and
mutual concern and respect . . . neither her crime nor her punishment can have the
meaning which this [communicative and penitential] account ascribes to them.").
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term as shorthand for the approved purposes of punishment. 156 The
Australian Law Reform Commission and the Canadian Sentencing Commission also approved 'just deserts" as sentencing rationales.1 57 The time
was right for the ideas and the vocabulary, and they were enthusiastically
received. That is no longer true, however, and it may help make future
options clearer and improve both normative and policy analyses if we try
to discern the normative dimensions along which future developments
are likely to occur.
B. Ideas for the Twenty-First Century
So what normative ideas about punishment are likely to prove useful
in coming decades? They must take account of different cultural and
political climates from those prevalent thirty years ago and acknowledge
different prevailing sensibilities.
The basic elements of normative frameworks will be the same-consequentialist ideas about crime prevention and moral education, retributive ideas about deserved punishments, equality, and proportionalitybut the mix will be different. Partly because of revived interest and confidence in rehabilitative programs, and partly because the last fifteen years'
decline in crime rates has created a public and policy climate more amenable to humane policy initiatives,1 58 both rehabilitative dispositions and
individualized processes will figure prominently. Two directions of theory development are likely.
1. Refinement of Limiting Retributivism. - Limiting retributivist theories, of which Norval Morris's is the best known, are likely to provide a
normative framework that will be compatible with the sensibilities and
secular developments of coming decades. 159 Morris, though working
within a retributivist framework, managed to avoid most of the
problems-arbitrariness, using offenders as means, unnecessary sever160
ity-that bedevil von Hirsch's theory.
156. See 1987 Or. Laws 619; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and
Practice, 22 Crime & Just. 363, 393 (1997) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing Principles]
("One of the [Minnesota] commission's earliest prescriptive choices was its decision to
adopt just deserts as the 'primary' sentencing goal under the guidelines .... " (citing Minn.
Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, The Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines:
Three-Year Evaluation, at v, 10-14 (1984))).
157. See Austl. Law Reform Comm'n, Sentencing of Federal Offenders 34 (1980)
(noting "renaissance of support for 'just deserts' and retribution," although declining to
apply it as guiding principle in sentencing reform); Canadian Sentencing Comm'n,
Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach 143 (1987) (endorsing "just deserts" as
rationale for sentencing).
158. A number of illustrations of this are given in Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at
3-20 (noting creation of special drug courts for drug-abusing offenders, diversion of drug
abusers into treatment programs, and support for medical use of marijuana).
159. See Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 156, 407-26 (describing how
Minnesota has successfully adopted Morris's sentencing approach).
160. See Morris, Future, supra note 2, at 58-84 (citing parsimony, dangerousness, and
desert as three primary justifications for imprisonment).
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Rather than mechanically solving the problem of cardinal desert's
unknowability, by means of the ordinal desert device, Morris acknowledged it. Rather than proposing a framework for imposition of "deserved
punishments," he promoted "not undeserved" punishments. By this, he
meant to take account of two empirical realities: First, people differ significantly in their judgments of what punishment an offense absolutely
deserves, and second, there is much wider agreement about undeserved
punishments-punishments that are too severe (or, less often, punishments that are too lenient). A normative theory that allows punishments
that are not undeserved will be compatible with prevailing norms about
punishment and provide a framework within which policymakers can
specify punishments.' 6 '
Rather than using offenders as means to an instrumental end (that
of protecting the scheme's theoretical integrity and formal logic), Morris
would allow punishments above the minimum if fairly exacting empirical
t6 2
tests could be satisfied, but never above the maximum.
Rather than requiring unduly harsh punishments because the machinery requires it, Morris would prescribe, consistent with Bentham's
parsimony principle, that every offender be sentenced at the bottom of
the range of not undeserved punishments unless there were good, articul163
able, empirically validated reasons for doing otherwise.
In sum, rather than treating offenses, offenders, and punishments
generically, Morris would allow judges to take account of individual
differences.
2. Emerging Conceptions ofJustice. - Morris's limiting (or "negative")
retributivism is more flexible than von Hirsch's positive-retributivist desert theory, but more divergent theories of restorative and community
justice are waiting to be elaborated. Restorative justice programs and
ideas are proliferating in most western countries, but mainstream punishment theory has not yet been able to encompass them.' 64 The principal
161. See id. at 78 (noting that criminal law as "moral teacher" requires both a
punishment floor and ceiling); Norval Morris & Michael Tonry, Between Prison and
Probation 87 (1990) ("[W]hy may policymakers not justly create standards that authorize
imposition of any sentence that is not undeserved (that is, that falls within the range of
punishments that reasonable people would regard as deserved)?").
162. See Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical
Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 393, 431-33 (1986)
(noting that punishment term should not be extended by prediction of dangerousness
"beyond that which would be justified as deserved punishment independently of that
prediction" and that finding of greater than average dangerousness "must be shown by
reliable evidence" before "intensify[ing] or extend[ing]" punishment).
163. See Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 Crime &Just.
1, 35, 37 (1985) (describing how predictions of dangerousness would only serve as upward
departures from a base).
164. See John Braithwaite, Principles of Restorative Justice, in Restorative Justice and
Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? 1, 5-6 (Andrew von Hirsch et al.
eds., 2003) ("If there were an award for the intellectual tradition least likely to nourish an
integrated theory of restorative justice, the philosophy of punishment would surely be a
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problem is that proponents of restorative justice want to allow participants in restorative processes to decide upon resolutions that emerge
from particular circumstances, whereas desert theorists and most lawyers
want to impose external constraints and consistency rules on outcomes.
Restorative programs are likely to continue to expand, and theorists will
eventually have to cease merely deploring them and instead develop normative analyses concerning their application.
Similarly, proponents of recent British Labour Government crime
control initiatives need to develop sustained normative justifications on
communitarian grounds for policies that, to critics, appear to be profoundly illiberal. 16 5 So far, to my knowledge, no serious scholarly efforts
have been devoted to developing a principled justification for policies
such as these.

166

Restorative and communitarian theories, if they are to be compatible
with ideas about individual rights and social contract conceptions of limited governmental powers, must solve two problems. First, they must provide plausible reasons for looking to local, compared with general, standards of just punishment. It is easy to conceive of a series of restorative
panels dealing with comparable cases and comparable offenders but resulting in radically different outcomes that have been unanimously
agreed to by all participants, including the victim, the offender, and their
loved ones.
Restorative justice proponents see little difficulty. What can be
wrong, they would ask, with a negotiated outcome to which all involved
have agreed under circumstances free from coercion or intimidation?
What could be more just than an outcome that all involved agree resolves
the problem it is meant to address? What happens in one conference
room has nothing to do with what happens in another. Even if two substantially similar cases result in substantially different outcomes, so long
as everyone involved in each case believes the outcomes in their cases are
just, then they are. That the outcomes might be very different across
cases is unimportant. Many lawyers would respond that injustice lies in
the violation of notions of horizontal equity: Similarly situated offenders

contender."); Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of
"Restorative Justice," 2003 Utah L. Rev. 375, 380-86 (describing conflict between
restorative justice and conceptions of just punishment).
165. The British government, for example, is aggressively promoting use of antisocial
behavior orders (ASBO) as a solution to local disorder and problem behavior. The order
is the outcome of a civil proceeding, with civil procedure and evidence rules and a civil law
burden of proof, and need not and generally does not concern criminal behavior;
however, violation of the resulting ASBO is a criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37, § 1 (Eng.).
166. There have been serious efforts to reconcile communitarian ideas with
retributive punishment theories. See, e.g., Duff, Trials, supra note 34, at 195-204
(discussing synthesis of retribution and consequentialism).
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who have committed comparable offenses have received very different
16 7
penalties, and that is unjust.
Different conceptions of punitive justice are involved: One is processual (a unanimously agreed-upon outcome of a fair deliberation is just),
and the other is substantive (only a deserved, or not undeserved, punishment is just). The respective calculi are fundamentally different. For restorative justice proceedings, the aim is constructively to solve a problem
in a way that all involved agree is just and appropriate. For a retributive
theorist, the aim is to impose a sentence that adequately reflects the harm
and culpability embodied in the current crime, in light of the offender's
prior criminal record.
For processual restorative conceptions of justice to be reconciled
with prevailing conceptions of deserved punishment, the range of allowable comparison will probably have to shrink. Few people seem to care
much about disparate sentences across state lines. Theorists and policymakers (in theory) worry about disparities across county lines, or urbansuburban-rural divides, but few people become very exercised about
them, presumably because of a notion that local culture or subculture
shapes local conceptions of justice and practitioners who have been
shaped by those conceptions will reflect them in their actions and decisions. As the range for comparison narrows, we become less comfortable
in theory or practice. Theorists will have to begin to develop plausible
arguments for why more local conceptions (limited ultimately, reductively, to the individual restorative panel) may legitimately shape decisions that deserve to be called just.
Second, more fully than they have in the past, restorative and communitarian theories must supply plausible accounts for why it is just to
take community considerations into account in resolving individual cases.
This is, however, merely an application of the more general conflict between collective interests and individual rights that communitarian theorists must address.
What seems clear is that conditions in the early twenty-first century
are sufficiently different from those in the 1970s that new theoretical
ideas, and new policies consistent with them (or vice versa), are likely to
emerge. The sooner we put aside the conventional views and wisdoms of
the recent past in order to work in a new reality, the sooner new ideas
about justice and new policies and programs reconcilable with them will
emerge.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Few would claim that policymakers are heavily influenced by academics' theorizing. They are influenced instead by their own normative pref167. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 164, at 382 (discussing importance of guidelines
in maintaining sentencing uniformity).
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erences, beliefs, and self-interest, by institutional considerations, and by
their sense of public opinion.
In relation to punishment, the public is ahead of policymakers and
penal theorists. The public resonance of retributive ideas and the public's commitment to punitive policies have been changing for at least five
years. By 2002, in the face of fierce opposition from the federal government and law enforcement agencies, voters in eight states had approved
the medical use of marijuana. 168 In 2000, California voters approved Proposition 36, which required large numbers of first and second time drugdependent offenders to be diverted from prosecution and imprisonment
to treatment; 69 District of Columbia voters in 2002 approved the comparable Ballot Initiative 62, although a federal court subsequently struck
down the measure as impermissibly encroaching on the District's freedom to allocate funds.

170

The general public no longer regards crime as among America's
most pressing problems. From 1980 to 1990, according to the Gallup
poll, crime consistently ranked among the top three. In March 2002,
crime ranked fifteenth and drugs twelfth, way behind poverty, dissatisfac171
tion with government, and the high cost of living.
Public attitudes to punishment also have changed dramatically. In a
1994 poll by Peter D. Hart Associates, forty-eight percent of Americans
said their preferred crime control strategy would be to address the underlying causes of crime, while forty-two percent preferred stricter sentencing. In a 2001 Hart Poll, sixty-five percent of Americans preferred the
root causes approach, and only thirty-two percent favored stricter
172
sentencing.
A school of thought associated with Dan Yankelovich, longtime head
of a major public opinion polling company, asserts that policymakers
must operate on any subject in any place at any time within the bounds of
public permission on that subject and in that place and time. 1 73 On the
subject of punishment, in this place and in this time, the boundaries are
wider than they have been for decades, and practitioners can be expected
168. Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Doctor Stands Out in Marijuana Prescriptions,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2002, at AO.
169. Evelyn Nieves, California Gets Set to Shift on Sentencing Drug Users, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 10, 2000, at A18.
170. See Judge Strikes Down D.C. Treatment Ballot Initiative, Alcoholism & Drug
Abuse Wkly., Feb. 17, 2003, at 1.
171. Tonry, Thinking, supra note 18, at 16.
172. Id.
173. See John Doble & Stephen Immerwahr, Delawareans Favor Prison Alternatives,
in Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times 259, 259-65 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen
Hatlestad eds., 1997) (describing study examining "limits set by public opinion on policy
makers'

choices"

with

regard

to

intermediate

sanctions).

See

generally

Daniel

Yankelovich, Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World,
at xi-xiii (1991) (recounting experience in opinion polling and acknowledging
contributions by John Doble and John Immerwahr).
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to range more widely within them than they have in the recent past. In
many places, they already are. The proliferation of treatment-premised
drug courts, 17 4 the easing in many states of mandatory minimum sentence laws, 175 and the creation of new diversionary programs from prose17 6
cution are examples.
Changing public attitudes-in particular a widening of the bounds
of political permission concerning crime within which policymakers can
operate-will result in significant changes in criminal justice policies and
practices in coming years, whether or not punishment theories change to
accommodate, interpret, explain, and assess them.
The following significant policy changes are underway in various
places and are likely to develop in the United States:
(1) The reach of restorative justice programs outside the criminal
justice system into much more serious crimes than heretofore, with the
possibility thatjudges and prosecutors in practice often will defer to their
77
outcomes;1
(2) The incorporation of restorative justice initiatives inside the
criminal justice system. For example, New Zealand's juvenile justice system assigns all cases to a conference, either in lieu of court processing
178
or-for the most serious cases-between adjudication and sentencing;
(3) The development of prosecutorial diversion systems that will divert increasingly serious cases from the justice system altogether, as Ger179
man prosecutors have been doing for thirty years;
(4) The increased individualization of sentencing by judges, as has
180
been happening year-by-year in the federal system;
174. See Nat'l Ass'n of Drug Court Prof is, What Is a Drug Court?, at http://www.
nadcp.org/whatis (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing drug courts in general).
175. E.g., Fox Butterfield, States Ease Laws on Time in Prison, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2,
2001, at Al (tracing developments in a number of states rolling back mandatory minimum
laws-particularly Louisiana, Connecticut, Indiana, and North Dakota-to change in
political climate due to falling crime rates, cost of exploding prison populations, and
slowing economy).
176. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1 (West 2004) (commonly known as
Proposition 36; establishing that "any person convicted of a nonviolent drug possession
offense shall receive probation").
177. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation 16-26
(2002) (discussing restorative justice in context of nursing home regulation, Asian
community policing, trade practices enforcement, and describing restorative justice
conferences).
178. See, e.g., Allison Morris, Youth Justice in New Zealand, 31 Crime & Just. 243,
260-68 (2004) (describing in detail how juvenile offenders move through New Zealand
system and are sent into conferences).
179. Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in Sentencing and
Sanctions in Western Countries, supra note 71, at 188, 197-99, 207 (describing German
practice of conditional dismissal, where accused can avoid conviction by agreeing to
restitution or charitable donation).
180. Bowman & Heise, supra note 21, at 1126 (arguing that individual discretion on
part of judiciary caused drop in average drug sentences at federal level).
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(5) The development by sentencing commissions and state legislatures of schemes for assigning treatments to offenders, from those on
probation to those who are incarcerated. Judges in such schemes act as
sentence managers and will, with advice, set the initial conditions of
sentences and oversee their gradual modification as offenders stumble or
thrive. Delaware judges in theory have long performed such a role;1 8 1
(6) The evolution of increasingly porous and contingent lower
bounds on the sentences thatjudges may impose in relation to conviction
offenses, just as Blakely v. Washington'8 2 and United States v. Booker 8 3 have
now set absolute upper bounds.
(7) The development of communitarian crime control schemes that
weight community interests substantially more heavily relative to offenders' liberty and procedural interests than most criminal justice systems
now do, as England's government now does with antisocial behavior orders and will do across a wide range of processes when the Criminal Jus8 4
tice Act 2003 is fully implemented.'
I have mixed personal views about many of these developments, but
they are likely to happen, even if philosophers and other penal theorists
do not begin to develop analytical tools for assessing them.
Traditional desert theories cannot encompass these changes. Limiting retributivist theories may be able to, but they will have to stretch to
encompass restorative, communitarian, and pretrial diversionary
processes. The greatest need, though, is for entirely new consequentialist
theories that can balance competing values in a new era characterized by
very different sensibilities than those that characterized the 19 7 0s, when
much current theorizing about punishment took shape. There is plenty
of work to be done.
Grant Gilmore offered a theory of statutory obsolescence in commercial law: By the time issues percolate through court systems and judicial
preconceptions enough to become sufficiently ripe to attract legislative
attention, the commercial world will long since have addressed the
problems in practice, and the legislation will be obsolescent when en181. See Richard Gebelein, Sentencing Reform in Delaware, in Sentencing Reform in
Overcrowded Times, supra note 173, at 88, 89-90 (explaining that at any level of
supervision or incarceration, courts can order variety of treatments; " [s] uccess can result in
accelerated movement through and out of the criminal justice system; failure can result in
additional sanctions .... ."). This was a major proposal of England's Halliday report. See
Halliday et al., supra note 94, at ch. 7. Halliday was explicit about the theoretical
implications of his proposals: "The proposed guidelines should look for consistency of
approach, rather than uniform outcomes, and recognize justifiable disparity ....
Id. at iv.
182. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
183. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
184. See Tonry, Punishment, supra note 94, at 32-33 (explaining how under Criminal
Justice Act 2003, prior convictions trigger increased incarceration despite fact that
evidence suggests incarceration of any length will not prevent perpetrators of minor crimes
from offending again, and despite feasibility of rehabilitation programs that would treat
offenders).
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acted.' 8 5 Punishment theorizing is not in exactly that place, but the risk
is the same. Theories that speak to yesterday's problems are not likely to
influence substantially tomorrow's solutions.
There are good reasons why writers on penal theory should attempt
to recast their theorizing so that it speaks to today's and tomorrow's
problems and sensibilities and not primarily to yesterday's.
Writings on penal theory and punishment philosophy seldom have
much discernible influence on penal policies or practices, but they sometimes provide analytical frameworks that help policymakers think
through problems. This occasionally happens directly, as when policymakers explicitly invoke ideas or theories they have encountered. More
often it happens indirectly, as ideas learned early in life percolate
through people's consciousness and experience to shape the ways they
think.
Occasionally, policymakers acknowledge the existence of the academic literature, as in the 1980s when Minnesota's sentencing commission expressly adopted "Modified Just Deserts" and "Punishment" as its
guideline rationales,,and the U.S. Sentencing Commission felt obliged to
18 6
explain why it had not done so.
The literature is important in its own right, however, because it influences the thinking of successive generations of teachers, students, and
practitioners.' 8 7 What academics believe inevitably shapes how and what
they teach, in effect creating the intellectual air that students breathe,
and not surprisingly becoming rooted in students' understanding and
normative beliefs. The more theory speaks to today's problems and re185. Cf. Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461, 476
(1967) (arguing that Uniform Commercial Code was obsolescent when it was drafted, and
that "[t]he true function of a codifying statute is to reduce the past to order and
certainty-and, thus, to abolish it").
186. As the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual explains,
A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile the
differing perceptions of the purposes [crime control and "just deserts"] of
criminal punishment. . . . Adherents of these points of view have urged the
Commission to choose between them, to accord one primacy over the other.
Such a choice would be profoundly difficult.... A clear-cut Commission decision
in favor of one of these approaches would diminish the chance that the
guidelines would find the widespread acceptance they need for effective
implementation. As a practical matter, in most sentencing decisions both
philosophies may prove consistent with the same result.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual appx. § 1AI, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/2004guid/Chapl.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
187. See, e.g., id. at 9 (describing how guidelines were developed through "extensive
hearings, deliberation, and consideration of substantial public comment" and that the
Guidelines will continue to evolve with further "research, experience, and analysis");
Andrew von Hirsch, Structure and Rationale: Minnesota's Critical Choices, in The
Sentencing Commission and Its Guidelines 84, 84-85 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1986)
(discussing how Minnesota guidelines incorporate policy choices that could have been
influenced by substantial academic literature).
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flects or at least acknowledges today's sensibilities, the more useful it will
be.
The early twenty-first century is a time when crime rates are falling,
which makes people less judgmental and vindictive, and thus open to
new, more constructive, and less punitive responses to crime. It is a time
when people believe that treatment works and are willing to put money
and political capital where their mouths are. 188 It is a time when new
ideas about restorative and community justice are emerging. It is also a
time, however, when people are less troubled than in recent decades
about racial and other disparities and are less supportive of civil liberties
and procedural rights. It is a complicated time, full simultaneously of
promise and peril for those who believe that what we do to offenders and
prisoners matters.
Academics have no greater access to truth or wisdom than anyone
else, but they do occupy a privileged position as observers, commentators,
and kibitzers. Philosophers and other theorists, if they are lucky, can
help shape the directions of future policy by helping practitioners and
policymakers recognize ethically difficult new issues and think through
alternate ways in which they might be addressed and at what ethical costs.
To play that role, they will have to work hard to escape the blinkered
thinking of the past. There is no view from nowhere. What we see depends on where and when we stand. Nonetheless, academics stand in
places that may allow broader lines of sight than are available to most
other people.
188. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.

